

Υπάρχει (ακόμα) η διάκριση ανάμεσα σε Ηπειρωτική και Αναλυτική Φιλοσοφία; Είναι αναγκαίο να γεφυρωθεί η Αναλυτική - Ηπειρωτική διάκριση; - Μ.Α

Αναφερόμενη στην συρρίκνωση της επιρροής της φιλοσοφίας στο μοντέρνο κόσμο, η Hannah Arendt έγραφε πως «οι φιλόσοφοι έγιναν είτε επιστημονολόγοι (...) ή όργανα του *Zeitgeist*» (The Human Condition, 1958). Στο σημείο που αληθεύει αυτός ο σχετικά απλουστευτικός ισχυρισμός, θα μπορούσαμε να πούμε πως αντανακλά το αποτέλεσμα εσωτερικών ιστορικών και φιλοσοφικών πεποιθήσεων οι οποίες δημιούργησαν ένα χάσμα (αυστηρό ή λιγότερο ξεκάθαρο) στον κλάδο της φιλοσοφίας, με έγκυρα αιτήματα στις δύο πλευρές του. Το αρχικό θέμα είναι η έννοια της ίδιας της φιλοσοφίας και ο τρόπος με τον οποίο εκτυλίσσεται. Θέτοντάς το απλά, εάν η επιστημονική προσέγγιση θεωρηθεί ο πιο στενός εταίρος της φιλοσοφίας, τείνουμε προς έναν αναλυτικό τρόπο σκέψης. Αν θεωρήσουμε ότι πρόκειται για ερμηνεία εννοιολογικής φύσης, βρίσκουμε την ηπειρωτική παράδοση πιο ελκυστική. Εδώ, φυσικά, θα συναντήσουμε ενστάσεις και προβληματισμό: σε ποιά από τις δύο κατηγορίες εντάσσεται ο Wittgenstein; Όπως τίθεται και από το Μίλτο Θεοδοσίου, σε τι ακριβώς χρησιμεύει η κατηγοριοποίηση αυτή για την κατανόηση ενός έργου και για τη δημιουργία ενός νέου;

Το ερώτημα για το κατά πόσο υπάρχει (ακόμα) η διάκριση ανάμεσα σε αναλυτική και ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία, και εάν η γεφύρωση της είναι αναγκαία, τίθεται για μια σύγχρονη αποτίμηση, μια καταγραφή σκέψεων από φιλοσόφους με διαφορετικά ενδιαφέροντα και εξειδικεύσεις, με στόχο τη μεγαλύτερη δυνατή κατανόηση του ζητήματος, καθώς αποβλέπουμε στον φιλοσοφικό πλουραλισμό και την ενθάρυνση του διαλόγου. Μπορεί οι εκπρόσωποι διαφορετικών παραδόσεων και κατευθύνσεων να ανταποκρίνονται με συγκεκριμένους τρόπους στα ερωτήματα που καλούνται να εξετάσουν, όμως το σημείο εκκίνησης ή ο στόχος παραμένουν ως ένα βαθμό τα ίδια, και αυτός είναι ένας λόγος για τον οποίο η επικοινωνία μεταξύ τους μπορεί να θεωρηθεί θεμιτή.

Οι απαντήσεις που δεχθήκαμε αντιμετωπίζουν το θέμα με διάφορους τρόπους: προτείνοντας λύσεις, προειδοποιώντας για ενδεχόμενες παγίδες ή υποστηρίζοντας τη διατήρηση διαφορετικών σφαιρών. Ο Graham Harman εκφράζει την ανάγκη αντικατάστασης αντί για γεφύρωσης των δυο ρευμάτων, ενώ η Shannon Dea αναφέρεται στην προσπάθεια εναλλαγής φιλοσοφικού «κώδικα». Η D'Agostini προειδοποιεί πως τέτοιες προσπάθειες πρέπει να αποφύγουν πιθανές «αμοιβαίες μολύνσεις» καθώς και οι δύο πλευρές έχουν ελαττώματα, ενώ ο Marconi αναφέρει πως η εξειδίκευση που συχνά απαιτεί η φιλοσοφική δραστηριότητα δεν προσδίδει τη δυνατότητα επέκτασης έξω από τον άμεσα σχετικό χώρο δράσης. Ακόμη, η Mélika Ouelbani αναφέρει πως οι μεθοδολογικές διαφορές έχουν σημασία, και γι'αυτό το λόγο η διάκριση δε μπορεί να απορριφθεί. Εξίσου ενδιαφέρουσα είναι η προσέγγιση του Critchley: αν τελικά η φιλοσοφία αφορά τη δημιουργική σκέψη και όχι τον εκτενή σχολιασμό ή την «απλή τεχνική για τον ακονισμό της

Is there (still) a Continental - Analytic divide in philosophy? Is it necessary to bridge the Analytic - Continental divide?

- M.A

Referring to the shrinking influence of philosophy in the modern world, Hannah Arendt wrote that 'philosophers became either epistemologists (...) or the organs of the *Zeitgeist*' (The Human Condition, 1958). To the extent that this somewhat reductive claim is true, we could say that it reflects the result of internal historical and philosophical convictions which created a gap in the field of philosophy (strict or less clear), with valid claims on both sides. The initial issue is the meaning of philosophy itself and the way in which it takes place. Putting it simply, if the scientific approach is considered to be the closest partner to philosophy, we tend towards an analytic way of thinking. If we consider philosophy to be conceptual interpretation we find the continental tradition more attractive. Here, naturally, we can find objections and puzzlement: to which of the two categories does Wittgenstein belong? As expressed by Miltos Theodosiou, what exactly is the use of such categorisation for the understanding of a piece of work and the creation of a new one?

The question as to what extent there (still) is a divide between analytic and continental philosophy, and whether its bridging is necessary, is posed for a contemporary appraisal, a recording of thoughts by philosophers with different interests and specialisations, with the purpose of the greatest possible understanding of the issue, since we aim for philosophical pluralism and the encouragement of dialogue. Even though representatives of the different traditions respond in a specific way to the questions they mean to examine, the starting point or the goal are to an extent the same, and this is a reason why communication between them might be considered desirable.

The responses we received deal with the matter in various ways: suggesting solutions, warning against potential traps or supporting the keeping of the different spheres. Graham Harman expresses the need for a replacement instead of bridging the two currents, while Shannon Dea talks about the attempt for philosophical 'code-switching'. At the same time, D'Agostini warns that efforts for dialogue should avoid potential 'mutual contaminations' since both fields have flaws, while Marconi argues that the level of specialisation often required by philosophical activity does not give the possibility for expansion outside one's most relevant space of action. Moreover, Mélika Ouelbani mentions that the methodological differences are important, and for this reason the distinction cannot be deposed. Critchley's approach is of equal interest: if philosophy is about creative thought and not extensive commentary or a 'technique for the sharpening of common sense', then this effort can continue its course, overcoming sectarianism but simultaneously recognising the cultural 'habitats' and learning

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κοινής λογικής», τότε αυτή η προσπάθεια μπορεί να συνεχίσει την πορεία της, ξεπερνώντας τον σεχταρισμό, αλλά ταυτόχρονα αναγνωρίζοντας τους πολιτιστικούς «βιότοπους» και μαθαίνοντας να μιλάει «τη γλώσσα της φυλής». Το θέμα όπως θίγεται από την Matar, δεν είναι αν τελικά κερδίζει κάποια 'μάχη' η επιστήμονας ή ο λογοτέχνης. Και οι δύο περιπτώσεις κρύβουν έναν ενδεχόμενο συντηρητισμό που συχνά προσπαθεί να δαμάσει προσπάθειες, καλώντας τον έναν να γίνει το άλλο, και ξεχνώντας τον πραγματικό στόχο, ο οποίος έχει πάντα να κάνει με την κατανόηση. Το Gavagai, όπως εκφράζει άλλωστε και το όνομά του, ακολουθεί μια παρόμοια κατεύθυνση τόσο ως περιοδικό όσο και ως φιλοσοφική κοινότητα η οποία εντάσσει διαφορετικές απόψεις και φιλοσοφικά ενδιαφέροντα. Η φιλοσοφική δραστηριότητα μπορεί να συνεχίσει το έργο της ανεξάρτητα από διαφορές, και σίγουρα προσπαθώντας να ξεπεράσει καχυποψίες και εχθρική διάθεση.

to speak 'the language of the tribe'. The point, as expressed by Matar, is not whether some battle is won by the 'scientist' or the literary writer. Both cases conceal a potential conservatism which often tries to tame efforts, inviting the former to become the latter and vice versa, forgetting the real goal which is always related to understanding. Gavagai, as its name expresses, follows a similar course both as a journal and a philosophical community which includes different opinions and philosophical directions. Philosophical activity can continue its work independent of differences while trying to overcome suspicion and hostility.

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Analytic Philosophy's Fire Alarm

Anyone who questions or raises doubts over analytic philosophy's role or significance today indirectly pulls a fire alarm in our framed democracies, our culture, and our universities. The doubter will immediately be attacked theoretically, academically, and probably also personally. This has happened to me (and many other continental philosophers) on several occasions. It does not bother me at all. It's just a pity things are this way. The books, essays, and articles that set off the alarm are not meant to dismiss analytic philosophy but simply to remind everyone it's not the only way to philosophize. My concern is educational (given the prevalence of analytic programs in universities), political (given its imperialistic approach), and also professional (for the little space given to continental philosophers in academia). The point is that we are not even allowed to generalize or be ironic, an essential component of philosophy as [Gianni Vattimo](#) and [Slavoj Žižek](#) show in their practice.

The problem is not that John Searle was [honored](#) by George W. Bush in 2004 (with a National Humanities Medal) or that the research of other analytic philosophers is often funded by government grants but rather that these grants are not always distributed among other traditions. After all, philosophers are not supposed to simply analyze concepts in their university offices but also to engage with the political, economic, and cultural environments that surrounds them, as Judith Butler, Peter Sloterdijk, and Simon Critchley have done so well for years.

Sure, one must defend one's philosophical position, but it's not a matter of truth or honor. In philosophy and the humanities in general it has never been about being correct or on the right side of history but rather interpreting differently in order for the "conversation to continue," as [Richard Rorty](#) used to say. This conversation is probably also what drove another great American philosopher, [Arthur Danto](#), to stress the "value of letting go." After all, "philosophical disagreement," he said, "is not so important" because the "important thing is to be able to start over again someplace else." But in order to start over someplace else, it's necessary to over-

come not only metaphysics, which some analytic philosophers have managed to do, but also its "imperialistic approach," as Jacques Derrida once said. It should not come as a surprise that the French philosopher, who was among the first to point out analytic philosophy's political ambitions, often set off this fire alarm with his deconstructionist approach. This is probably why in 1990 a group of analytic philosophers attempted (without success) to convince Cambridge University that honoring the French master was a mistake.

The positive aspect of this alarm is that it indirectly gathers together people concerned with philosophical education, plurality, and style. When any of these three features are ranked, restricted, and imposed we can see the analytic/continental divide emerge. Those of us who share the concern that ranking departments and imposing certain philosophical styles harm the discipline are relegated, as Michael Marder correctly pointed out, "to the margins of the profession" and are seen as concerned with insignificant philosophical problems. But marginalizing these continental academics in favor of a scientific training in problem-solving approaches in formal and symbolic logic not only restricts students' interest in the plurality of philosophy but also permits the value of the discipline to be determined by universities rather than the philosophers who teach in them.

Following this corporate ranking approach, students interested in feminist theory, hermeneutics, or animal studies are not as likely to study with such specialists as Amy Allen, Georgia Warnke, or Mathew Calarco because they don't teach in top-ranked universities. But how can students become protégés of other philosophers (as Kant was of Martin Knutzen, Hans-Georg Gadamer of Martin Heidegger, Judith Butler of Maurice Natanson) if the relation is determined by university ranking rather than by student interest?

The same problem affects professors, who, instead of being asked to engage in research to publish books (as most philosophers have done throughout the history of philosophy), are now pressured to expose their results in articles (like scientists). Just as Adorno, after the Second World War, became alarmed that music had to be cut in or-

der to fit the temporal limits of the industrially produced LP, today we should also be alarmed that philosophers are forced to cut books into articles to fit the requirements of the ranked journal industry.

But this is not simply a matter of education and research; it's also about style. After all, when Danto was asked why he began to study Nietzsche in the sixties his response touched not only on Nietzsche's philosophical insights but also on the fact that "he didn't write like an accountant, the way most analytical philosophers did." If recalling this ironic statement sets off a fire alarm today, then the gap between analytic and continental philosophers is still alive, and anyone in agreement with Danto (as I am) will be attacked.

In sum, I do not believe, as Gary Gutting (a philosopher whom I truly respect) recently pointed out, that the "continental-analytic gap will begin to be bridged only when seminal thinkers of the Continent begin to write more clearly," but rather that it will happen only when the imperialistic approach of analytic philosophy is left aside to allow other styles to emerge and educate without being attacked, dismissed, and, most of all, marginalized.

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The distinction between continental and analytic traditions in philosophy is by now familiar, although any brief explanation is risky and liable to be unhelpful. Even to introduce continental philosophy with a single book, as I have done, is a challenging and perhaps foolhardy enterprise. Like many concepts, most of us know how to employ the analytic-continental distinction in most cases, even though it is difficult if not impossible to supply (as analytic philosophers once insisted we should) both necessary and sufficient conditions for its application.

The difficulties are obvious. A geographical identification of philosophers and philosophical traditions is generally of limited usefulness. Analytic philosophers acknowledge the important contributions of Kant, Frege and sometimes even Husserl, to say nothing of earlier thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes. Analytic philosophers can be found in 'continental' Europe, just as continental philosophers are by no means rare in the English-speaking countries where analytic philosophy is usually thought to have begun. Nor is it difficult to identify philosophers, like Wittgenstein, Habermas or Charles Taylor, whose ideas transcend the division.

Ironically, both the difficulties and the usefulness of the analytic-continental distinction reflect its polemical and quasi-ideological origins. John Stuart Mill recognized that what he called continental thinkers were doing philosophy in a register that diverged substantially from his own empirical, scientific and utilitarian concerns. Twentieth-century developments - including the formalization of symbolic logic and work in the foundations of mathematics, logical positivism and 'ordinary language' philosophy (predominantly 'English-speaking' but with important contributions from Auguste Comte, the Vienna Circle, Frege and Wittgenstein among others) laid the foundations for a polemical rejection of continental approaches. Heidegger, in particular, was singled out for condemnation (as Derrida would be later) as a perpetrator of 'meaningless' utterances concerning unanswerable and therefore pointless questions. The rejection of continental approaches was then applied retrospectively to other disapproved figures in the history of philosophy.

Continental philosophy was, in other words, first named as the excluded and devalued 'other' of analytic philosophy. However, like radical responses to excluded or devalued social identities, ethnicities and sexualities, the term continental philosophy was subsequently (from the 1970s) adopted as a positive term. This move helped to rescue areas of philosophy neglected by the analytic tradition. From this perspective, thinkers like Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Husserl and their followers and exponents were seen to explore questions and offer insights that could not simply be dismissed as meaningless or 'unscientific'. By the same token, logical and conceptual analysis and enquiries modelled on the natural sciences (the methods favoured by analytic philosophers) seemed unlikely to provide satisfactory answers to questions in aesthetics, ethics, politics and other fundamental questions of human existence.

The analytic-continental distinction will remain useful, accordingly, as long as this ideological division in philosophy persists. Academic journals and departments are, in fact, still usually aligned to one or other pole of this opposition. Work associated with the opposing tradition is routinely rejected or, given the ever increasing demands on the time of researchers and teachers, ignored entirely. Increasingly specialized and compartmentalized, philosophers are (with notable exceptions) familiar mainly with the work of their collaborators and sub-disciplinary colleagues.

That said, the analytic-continental distinction should not be accorded rational or intellectual authority. In other words, it can never justify dismissing other thinkers, arguments and ideas without serious engagement or hermeneutic effort. It should not be allowed to prevent fruitful interactions between different approaches and thinkers. When a particular set of assumptions or disciplinary practices, thought to define a 'correct' analytic or continental approach, is treated as beyond question, then we are no longer dealing with philosophy. Philosophy surely implies unconditional reflection, reflection with no absolutes or unquestionable assumptions.

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This question splits into two: on the one hand, is there in fact a 'continental-analytic' divide?; and on the other, if there is, is it a good or a bad thing? I will take each question in turn.

In relation to the first question: It is clear that there once was such a divide, in the sense that philosophers took themselves to belong to traditions that were not only distinct (in the way that the traditions of western and non-western philosophy might be said to be distinct, for example), but positively hostile to one another. This divergence was marked by their respective canons, where both traditions broadly followed the same line as far as Kant, but then analytic philosophers largely skipped the nineteenth century (with the possible exception of J. S. Mill) and jumped to Frege, then the holy trinity of Russell, Wittgenstein and Moore, and then on to Quine and beyond. By contrast, continental philosophers took Hegel seriously, as well as Nietzsche, Marx and maybe Kierkegaard, and so were in a position to make sense of Heidegger, Sartre and Adorno and then later figures such as Derrida and Deleuze, who could only appear utterly baffling to analytic philosophers who lacked any understanding of the background to these thinkers. (Husserl is an interesting cross-over case, who was close enough to Kant and far enough from Hegel to figure in both canons, but read in rather different ways. And while the Pragmatist strand in analytic philosophy goes by a somewhat distinctive route, officially at least it is rather scornful of Hegel, with the exception of Dewey.)

If this is the right way to characterise the divide as it once was, we can now ask if it is the case now - does this kind of bifurcation in the canon still hold? Doubtless it still does in many places; but I think it is less starkly marked than it once was, as the 'missing' nineteenth century figures such as Hegel and Nietzsche have come to be assimilated within the analytic canon as well, thereby making it possible to render their successors more intelligible. Of course, there are possible dangers in this process, as some may feel that this assimilation amounts to appropriation and even outright distortion - but still, it must be helpful in building bridges.

Which brings us to the second question: is it a good thing that the

divide is broken down? I would argue it is, as it has always seemed to me to be based on a false assumption, namely that if one engages in philosophy by taking Hegel seriously, one is engaged in an entirely different discipline than if one does not, as the sorts of questions, methods and issues one will then be drawn into are no longer the same as what went before. In my view, this is to exaggerate the 'otherness' of Hegel, and to wrongly cut him off from the rest of the tradition. Once he is put back in his right place, then 'analytic' philosophers will be able to make sense of the Hegelian background needed to understand many of the issues that drive debates within the 'continental' tradition, thereby overcoming this artificial obstacle to dialogue and mutual comprehension.

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In the texts, there is no analytic-continental divide, if we understand the divide as important for the explanation, understanding and, most importantly, continued interpretation and application of those texts. So anyone approaching interesting problems in philosophy is ill-advised to think of them as analytic or continental. It is much more constructive to follow lines of research to pieces that challenge and improve current responses to a given problem. To close off or judge part of the library because of its tag is harmful and rather sad.

For example, I'm currently working on the counter-intuitive idea of an egalitarian sublime. Can the experience of the sublime lead to an egalitarian politics, or must it always be divisive in some way? Analytic commentators on Kant, continental critics and researchers on empirical theories of the sublime have important points to make about the definition of the concept and about the role it might play in political and ethical arguments. The nomenclature 'analytic' and 'continental' is dispensable - mere chitchat - when compared to the detail of what Guyer, Strawson or Adorno have to say.

If that's true for the texts, is it also true *for the academy*? It is still the case that some jobs, philosophers, societies, journals and departments are labelled analytic or continental. It is also true some think that it is significant that they are. I've already explained why I do not consider it important from a research point of view. However, I am certain that from the standpoint of particular careers, publications and departments it still matters a lot; for instance, for employment or for the survival of a department. Given my views on research, you can see that I don't think that it should matter, but it does.

We need constructive and far-sighted philosophy, not continental or analytic philosophy. Where labels get in the way of good appointments, it is important to fight for those who suffer wrongs on the basis of prejudice. This means that political and social organisation around politically meaningful tokens is worthwhile. However, at present, positive action for better gender and racial representation, greater diversity of subjects and methods, and resistance to

political interference, are more important than traditions.

To get down to the microcritique that underpins research, when reflecting on the philosophers I have done most work on, and on the philosophy of signs, it is clear to me that it is unhelpful to think of Deleuze, or Whitehead, or the philosophy of language as analytic or continental. We certainly do not need to think in that way. For example, there is currently interesting work on how to renew pragmatism and semiology. The research draws resources from philosophers and texts taken from both sides of the so-called divide. The inquiry does not mention the divide as important at all, because fine-grained analysis and interpretation requires resources that bridge the divide.

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In Defense of Divides

Although some philosophers see the discipline as organized around an “analytic-continental divide,” this distinction has never really made any sense. There are no deep philosophical and methodological similarities that unite those commonly placed in the “analytic” category, and the same hold for those identified as “continental.” And this should come as no surprise. Philosophy itself is a motley of idioms, ideas, debates, methods, puzzles, and aspirations. It would be utterly astounding, unbelievable in fact, were all of the philosophical activity over the past century to have produced but two “schools” or “traditions.” And a moment’s reflection demonstrates how absurd it all is. Can anyone really point to a significant and deep “divide” that separates Davidson from Gadamer into wholly distinct philosophical traditions that doesn’t also place Sellars and Hegel into the same tradition? Can anyone identify deep features of the Foucault/Derrida debates and the Searle/Derrida debates that render the former an internecine dispute and the latter a cross-traditional division? Or consider Rawls, Habermas, Ranciere, Nussbaum, and Honneth; to be sure, these figures disagree mightily about issues in political philosophy. Cut can anyone take seriously the idea that they are each pursuing a different kind of political philosophy?

The “analytic-continental divide” is a myth, a fabrication of mid-to-late 20th Century professional philosophers. To be sure, some myths and fabrications are worth preserving. But not this one. The “divide” between analytic and continental philosophy does not need to be “bridged.” Rather, the myth needs to be dispelled.

Here’s why. The myth of the divide now serves to constrain philosophical thinking. It does so by enabling philosophers to easily (all too easily) dodge philosophical disagreement by ascending to metaphysical diagnoses which posit deep methodological differences that in turn serve to explain away the disagreements. So, rather than pursue disagreements between, say, Nozickians and Foucauldians, the myth of the divide allows each camp to evade the other, while also enabling them to both insulate

their ideas from criticism, and yet carry on condemning the other "tradition" as philosophically defective. This is philosophically retrograde. The myth of the analytic-continental divide obstructs examination of the actual philosophical divides and disagreements that matter most.

Given the current state of the world, the need for outright and unhampered philosophical argumentation is paramount. That the discipline has erected its own blocks to all-in engagement is tragic, and that it spends so much time monitoring, policing, and fortifying these blocks is irresponsible. In dispelling the myth of the analytic-continental divide, we open the space of reasons to broader engagements. It is for the sake of confronting those divides that the mythological one needs to go.

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A few years ago, I participated in a workshop that brought together pragmatists and phenomenologists. After two days of scholarly discussions, we had a final opportunity to discuss the state of the profession for pragmatists and phenomenologists. It quickly became very clear that members of the two groups felt a real affinity for each other because they felt similarly marginalized by analytic philosophy, which is certainly the dominant mode of philosophizing in North America.

While I sympathized with them, their experiences didn't align with my own. Throughout my career, I have felt well-supported as I have moved back and forth between traditions. I started out as a very analytic undergraduate philosopher. During my M.A., I had shifted to a more continental approach. I wrote my thesis on Gadamer's hermeneutics, and my first conference talk was on Gadamer. I started my PhD intending to do continental philosophy. My new department was quite analytic and colleagues warned me that my continental work would be diminished there. On the contrary, some of the most analytic philosophers in the department attended my first departmental talk - on Heidegger - and were really supportive and interested. My work ultimately shifted away from continental philosophy - but not because anyone discouraged me from doing it. I just became interested in other things, and I followed my curiosity. These days, my work borrows elements from both the analytic and the continental traditions. I continue to feel welcome and respected in my philosophical community whether I'm working on analytic metaphysics or *l'écriture féminine*. I guess I've been lucky to have avoided marginalization as a sometime-analytic, sometime-continental feminist pragmatist.

Part of how I've gotten away with my continental aspects is code switching - being able to flip back and forth between speaking to analytic philosophers in their terms and to continental philosophers in theirs. My wide-ranging philosophical background makes me a good code-switcher. Code-switching is a lot like switching between languages in multilingual settings. And, as with multilingualism, I think there are huge advantages. I like to say that I read continentally and write analytically. I think that's a quite good approach, and one that has really supported my philosophical work.

Another big part of whether one is accepted as a continental (or pragmatist or feminist, etc., etc.) philosopher is which department or region one works in. Some departments (like my own) cultivate environments in which colleagues respect and value each other's methodological and subdisciplinary differences. Some departments, though, seem to disvalue (or even punish) divergence from the norm. From my perspective, there are probably more pluralistic departments in North America (I know less about other parts of the world) than there are narrow, non-pluralistic ones. The trouble is that some of the non-pluralistic departments are quite famous and influential. Even if there are lots of pluralistic little departments, if the big, powerful departments in general reject continental philosophy, then that sends a really discouraging message to the philosophers working in that tradition.

Whatever the reasons for the continued marginalization of continental philosophers, I think it's really crucial that philosophy as a discipline start doing a better job of embracing a wide range of philosophical approaches. As Kristie Dotson points out, characterizing scholarly work at the margins of philosophy as "not really philosophy" or as "not good philosophy" not only excludes alternative philosophical methods; it also has the effect of excluding women, racialized people and other under-represented groups from philosophy. Lack of (demographic) diversity is one of the biggest problems (perhaps the biggest problem) facing philosophy today. I think that we are going to need generous, optimistic, supportive pluralism about philosophical approaches if we have any hope of solving that problem. And if we don't, it's not clear to me how much longer philosophy as a discipline will last.

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Η θέση μου είναι ότι η διάκριση αναλυτικής και ηπειρωτικής φιλοσοφίας είναι υπαρκτή, αλλά το φιλοσοφικό ενδιαφέρον γι' αυτήν είναι κάτι το ανθυγιεινό.

Καταρχάς, δεν βλέπω πώς μπορεί κανείς να αρνηθεί την ύπαρξή της – για τα ελληνικά δεδομένα, οι σχετικές εργασίες του Στέλιου Βιρβιδάκη δείχνουν ότι αυτή η διάκριση δεν αποτελεί απλά και μόνο ένα τεχνητό, πολιτικό ή στενά ακαδημαϊκό ζήτημα, αλλά ένα γνήσιο «χάσμα» μεταξύ δύο παραδόσεων σκέψης, άρθρωσης λόγου και γραφής· η αποτίμηση, όμως, της φιλοσοφικής της σημασίας αποτελεί θέμα εντελώς διαφορετικό.

Κυρίως για λόγους βιογραφικούς, ο φιλοσοφικός προβληματισμός γύρω από τη διάκριση δεν κατάφερε να προσελκύσει την προσοχή μου: ξεκίνησα μελετώντας φιλοσοφία των Μαθηματικών και φιλοσοφία της Φυσικής· στην περίπτωση αυτή, η ιδέα μιας αντίπαλης «ηπειρωτικής» φιλοσοφίας, π.χ., για τη Γενική Θεωρία της Σχετικότητας, την Κβαντομηχανική ή τη Θεωρία των Αριθμών, και ο συνεπακόλουθος περιοριστικός χαρακτηρισμός των όσων διάβαζα ως απλά και μόνο «έργα αναλυτικής φιλοσοφίας», μου ήταν πρακτικά αδιανόητος. Με τον Wittgenstein αργότερα ως το κύριο θέμα μελέτης, πάλι δεν έβλεπα πώς η προσήλωση στη διάκριση με βοηθούσε να εμβαθύνω: δύσκολα εντάσσονται τα βιτγκενσταϊνικά γραπτά αποκλειστικά στη μία ή την άλλη πλευρά του χάσματος – και δεν επεδίωξα καν να το επιχειρήσω. Επιπλέον, δύο εργασίες με είχαν πείσει ικανοποιητικά ότι το μεμονωμένο ενδιαφέρον για την ίδια τη διάκριση ήταν, από βιτγκενσταϊνική σκοπιά, σπατάλη πολύτιμου χρόνου: ένα κείμενο του Κωστή Κωβαίου –του πιο εργατικού βιτγκενσταϊνικού φιλοσόφου στην Ελλάδα– στο οποίο οι πάντες κατηγορούνταν για «μεταφυσικές χίμαιρες», είτε αυτοί προέρχονταν από την αναλυτική είτε από την ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία· και μια εργασία του Jim Conant για το *Tractatus* («The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the *Tractatus*»), στην οποία οι «αναλυτικοί» προβληματισμοί του βιβλίου εντάσσονταν με συγκλονιστικό τρόπο στην ιστορία της φιλοσοφίας, ανοίγοντας δρόμους πέρα από οποιαδήποτε πόλωση έφερνε η αναλυτική-ηπειρωτική διάκριση.

Η πρώτη φορά που ένιωσα ότι η διάκριση δεν είναι μια αφηρημένη ιδέα ή μια περιθωριακή αντίληψη, αλλά κάτι το ζωντανό και δραστήριο μέσα στο πνευματικό μου περιβάλλον, συνέβη κατά περίεργο τρόπο ως εξής:

σε μια διάλεξη για το ευρύ κοινό, άκουσα έναν γνωστό Έλληνα μελετητή της αρχαίας ελληνικής φιλοσοφίας να δηλώνει δημοσίως, με ένα εξαιρετικά ήπιο αλλά άκρως πατερναλιστικό ύφος, ότι «Εμείς οι αναλυτικοί καταλαβαίνουμε τον Πλάτωνα – οι ηπειρωτικοί συνάδελφοί μας δεν τον καταλαβαίνουν, πώς να το κάνουμε»! Μέχρι τότε, δεν είχα φανταστεί ότι άνθρωποι με πολύ πιο στενά και εξειδικευμένα φιλοσοφικά ενδιαφέροντα από μένα, θα καταδίκάζαν με τέτοιες αφοριστικές δηλώσεις την ανάγνωση των «ηπειρωτικών» φιλοσοφικών κειμένων.

Η ανακάλυψη αυτή άλλαξε ριζικά την πορεία μου στη φιλοσοφία: προκάλεσε μια λαχτάρα για πειραματισμό και διεύρυνση των φιλοσοφικών μου οριζόντων, πολύ περισσότερο απ' ό,τι είχα βιώσει ως τότε. Η ανάγνωση του *Ο νους κι ο κόσμος* του John McDowell ενίσχυσε τη λαχτάρα μου αυτή, οδηγώντας με από τον Davidson και τον Quine στον Heidegger και τον Gadamer, και από τον Kant του Peter Strawson στον Hegel του Robert Pippin και τον Γερμανικό Ιδεαλισμό. Η πορεία αυτή με έφερε στη φαινομενολογία, την αποδόμηση, τη λακανική ψυχάνάλυση, την ηπειρωτική πολιτική φιλοσοφία και τον Žizek. Μολονότι τα περιβάλλοντα αυτά δεν κατάφεραν τελικά να με κρατήσουν, αυτό δεν συνέβη λόγω τάχα της έλλειψης επιχειρηματολογίας ή λόγω θεωρητικών ασυνέπειών τους (όπως θα περίμενε κανείς σύμφωνα με τη διάκριση)· απεναντίας, συνέβη για τον ίδιο λόγο που εγκαταλείπει κανείς έναν οποιοδήποτε φιλόσοφο ή το οποιοδήποτε σχήμα σκέψης: με κούρασε πνευματικά η αδιάκοπη επανάληψη και ανακύκλωση των βασικών ιδεών αυτών των φιλοσοφικών χώρων.

Σε κανένα σημείο αυτής της πορείας δεν αισθάνθηκα ότι συμβιβαζόμουν με κάτι λιγότερο ή ότι έκανα εκπώσεις στη σκέψη μου. Απεναντίας, διαπίστωνα κάθε τόσο ότι η συστηματική δέσμευση στο «χάσμα αναλυτικής και ηπειρωτικής φιλοσοφίας» δεν με βοηθούσε να κατανοήσω καλύτερα αυτό που διάβαζα ή να εμβαθύνω περισσότερο σε αυτό. Μάλλον το αντίθετο συνέβαινε: στις περιστάσεις εκείνες όπου η διάκριση γινόταν αισθητή, π.χ., εγείροντας ερωτήματα για το συγγραφικό ποίον του φιλοσόφου το έργο του οποίου είχε πέσει στα χέρια μου (γράφει καθαρά ο Derrida; έχει επιχειρήματα ο Adorno; είναι αναλυτικός ή ηπειρωτικός ο McDowell;) ή θέτοντας διλήμματα για τη λογική συνέπεια των γραπτών του, επήρχετο διάσπαση της προσοχής μου και μια αυξανόμενη καθυστέρηση στην πραγμάτευση των ζητημάτων με τα οποία είχα καταπιαστεί. Για παράδειγμα, αν με ενδιέφερε η έννοια της κανονιστικότητας

(όποια κι αν είναι αυτή), και η πραγμάτευση με οδηγούσε, λ.χ., από τον Davidson στον Fichte ή τον Hegel, δεν αποκόμιζα απολύτως τίποτε επιχειρώντας να πείσω τον εαυτό μου ότι ο Fichte και ο Hegel είναι (ή δεν είναι!) «ηπειρωτικοί» και ότι χρειάζεται ένας προληπτικός εμβολιασμός προτού αφοσιωθώ στην ανάγνωση του έργου τους. Ομολογούμενως, συναντούσα μεγαλύτερες δυσκολίες στο έργο των Ηπειρωτικών, το λεξιλόγιό τους ενίοτε με ξένιζε ενώ η βαθύτερη μέριμνα των γραπτών τους δεν μου ήταν πάντοτε ξεκάθαρη – αλλά αυτά μου συνέβαιναν σε διαφορετικό βαθμό με κάθε φιλόσοφο, ανεξάρτητα από τον προσανατολισμό του ως προς το «χάσμα αναλυτικής και ηπειρωτικής φιλοσοφίας». Η λύση ήταν να διαβάσω περισσότερο, να λάβω υπ' όψιν σοβαρότερα το ιστορικό πλαίσιο, να απευθυνθώ διαδικτυακά σε κάποιον ειδικότερο στο θέμα από μένα και φυσικά να αντλήσω βοήθεια από τη δευτερεύουσα βιβλιογραφία.

Δεν έχω καμία ένδειξη ότι ο περισσότερος κόπος, η εκτενής συζήτηση και η συστηματικότερη ανάγνωση δεν αποδίδουν καρπούς, τάχα επειδή κάποιοι φιλόσοφοι είναι «αναλυτικοί» και κάποιοι άλλοι «ηπειρωτικοί». Αντίθετα, η προκαταβολική εγρήγορση στους υποτιθέμενους κινδύνους, στους οποίους η παραγνώριση της διάκρισης φέρεται ότι εκθέτει τον φιλοσοφικό νου, αποδεικνυόταν πάντοτε ανασταλτική και φιλοσοφικά άκαρπη. Η φιλοσοφία, θεωρώ, είναι ένα πολύ δύσκολο και απαιτητικό εγχείρημα – πρέπει λοιπόν κανείς να δέχεται βοήθεια από όπου κι αν προέρχεται.

Μια παρόμοια στάση απέναντι στη φιλοσοφία χαρακτηρίζει και τον τρόπο που διαμορφώνω το πρόγραμμα της σειράς συζητήσεων *Εργοτάξιο Ιδεών* στο κέντρο της Αθήνας εδώ και έξι χρόνια. Ωστόσο, στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η επιλογή ομιλητών και θεμάτων σκοντάφτει πολύ συχνά στη διαφοροποίηση της φιλοσοφίας σε αναλυτική και ηπειρωτική: η «αναλυτική» θεματολογία δεν έχει πέραση στο ελληνικό κοινό, ενώ η «ηπειρωτική» βρίσκει πάντοτε ευρεία ανταπόκριση. Εντούτοις, δεν θεωρώ ότι αυτή η κατάσταση αντανάκλα μια συνειδητή επιλογή: απλώς στην ελληνική πραγματικότητα, η αναλυτική φιλοσοφία δεν είναι εξίσου γνωστή με την ηπειρωτική, σε τέτοιο βαθμό μάλιστα, ώστε η ύπαρξη και οι προβληματισμοί της πρώτης να αποτελούν ένα καλά κρυμμένο μυστικό που περιμένει τον Έλληνα αναγνώστη να το ανακαλύψει. Αλλά αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι πρέπει κανείς μονομερώς να δώσει προτεραιότητα είτε στην αναλυτική είτε στην ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία.

Συμπερασματικά, ομολογώ την αδυναμία μου να κατανοήσω τη φιλοσοφική σημασία του χάσματος αναλυτικής και ηπειρωτικής φιλοσοφίας. Επιπλέον, πιστεύω ότι, αν πρόκειται κάποιος να καταπιαστεί συστηματικά με επιμέρους φιλοσοφικά προβλήματα, η φιλοσοφική πορεία του δεν θα ωφεληθεί αν έχει κατά νου τις δυσκολίες και τα διλήμματα που γεννά η προσήλωση στο χάσμα αυτό.

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The Enduring Importance of the Analytic/Continental Split

As a former sportswriter I was fascinated by the case of basketball player Ben Wallace, who enjoyed a solid career in the NBA. Mr. Wallace acquired a reputation among *cognoscenti* for being the most underrated player in the sport. Yet there came a point when even casual fans began to call him “underrated,” and thus it was complained that he had actually become overrated. Whether or not this conclusion was fair, we easily recognize the *possibility* that something gains such a reputation for being undervalued that we begin to rate it too highly, forgetting the grain of justice in its previous neglect. But the opposite also occurs: something comes to be so widely regarded as *overrated* that we lose sight of why it was ever esteemed. This is now the case with the split between analytic and continental philosophy, which organized our view of the discipline for several decades, but has become an object of growing professional contempt.¹ I have encountered at least four different reasons for this disdain:

1. “The distinction is merely sociological.” This assumes that the existence of different subcultures in a field reflects nothing more than the sad dynamics of prejudiced group solidarity or cliquish in-group behavior. Yet there are often good reasons why one group emerges through commitment to certain axiomatic principles and another through allegiance to different ones. Rather than assuming that one of the groups has disreputable motives, we ought to consider the respective merits of their assumptions.

2. “It is ridiculous that there should be more than one kind of philosophy.” Though no one finds it absurd that there are 914 bird species in North America rather than just one, it will be said that this is a different case, since knowledge ought in principle

¹ Though I am not sure who originally coined the terms “analytic” and “continental,” I first encountered them early in graduate school in a book by the (continental) philosopher of technology Don Ihde, *Consequences of Phenomenology*. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986.) The Preface and First Chapter wrestle with the distinction directly.

to be unified. But at best this is a goal, not a starting point. Competing approaches exist even in physics, and insisting that just one prevail would risk premature exclusion of the most fruitful alternative.

3. "The other side are just fuzzy, self-indulgent historians / narrow-minded logic choppers with no historical or literary sense." Such insults are often exchanged, though we should not forget a built-in asymmetry: analytic philosophers are currently the dominant party in philosophy departments, and thus have more to gain from unification than continentals, who as a rule are less apt to decry the split.

4. "There is no split, because I *personally* embody the overcoming of it." In analytic philosophy we find those who think that since they or their friends work on such emblematic continental figures as Hegel, Nietzsche, or Heidegger in elite analytic departments, those who work on them elsewhere must simply not be very good; the blogger Brian Leiter is a shining example of this attitude. In continental thought we find Alain Badiou, an important thinker whose pride is not unequal to his talent: for him, the analytic/continental distinction is null and void, since he himself uses set theory notation but also writes about poetry.² Here Badiou forgets that he still belongs squarely to the tradition of continental philosophy, barely read by analytics.

If there is a genuine distinction between analytic and continental philosophy, what is it? As I see it, the most powerful clue is found in an important lecture of the 1890s by Franz Brentano, one of the last major figures appreciated by both camps.³ As Brentano sees it, philosophy has two different aspects: in one sense it is like the natural sciences, making discernible progress over time by increasing our knowledge of whatever topics it investigates; in another it

2 Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, trans. O. Feltham. (London: Continuum, 2013). Page xiv.

3 Franz Brentano, "The Four Phases of Philosophy and its Current State," which can be found in English in Balázs M. Mezei & Barry Smith, *The Four Phases of Philosophy*. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998.)

is more like the fine arts, with periods of ascendance dominated by classic figures and eras of decadence filled with epigones, with no pattern of continuous improvement. Though Brentano's translators Mezei and Smith try to do justice to both aspects in their commentary, they openly favor the "science" model of philosophy over the "fine arts" model, and are quick to dismiss such important continental figures as Heidegger and Derrida as degenerate obscurantists. If Mezei and Smith were typical continental philosophers instead, they would simply have done the opposite. But as I see it, the key to forward movement in philosophy is to do justice to both impulses described in Brentano. And given that analytic and continental philosophy are both too beholden to just one of Brentano's model, it is likely that both need replacement, rather than bridge-building synthesis or the final triumph of one.

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Sapere aude:

The exhaustion of theory and the promise of philosophy

It is agreeable to imagine a future in which the tiresome 'analyticContinental split' is looked back upon as an unfortunate temporary breakdown of communication - a future in which Sellars and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Putnam and Derrida, Rawls and Foucault are seen as fellow-travellers on the same journey

Richard Rorty

I think that it is at least arguable that the present state of philosophy is interestingly marked by the exhaustion of a whole series of theoretical paradigms. Analytical philosophy, as I mentioned above, has happily achieved some historical self-consciousness and become interested in its own tradition, as well as realizing that there is indeed a compelling story to be told about Germanophone philosophy between Kant and Frege. But one wonders whether this is too little too late, and whether the interest in the origins, the history, or indeed the Hegelian prehistory of analytic philosophy, as well as the current vogue for post-analytic philosophy, are simply attempts to shut the stable door after the horse has bolted.

In the German context, the Frankfurt School after Habermas's retirement is rather uncertain about its present agenda and future direction, and it is often difficult to see what now distinguishes it from broader mainstream movements in Anglo-American moral and political philosophy and social theory. Of course, this was the implicit point of much post-war German philosophy: normalization after the catastrophe of National Socialism. More widely, Germany is philosophically somehow becalmed, and the great post-war generation of Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Ernst Tugendhat, Michael Theunissen, Dieter Henrich, and Niklas Luhmann are almost all either deceased or retired, and their successors have not yet reached their intellectual heights.

And let's face it, Paris is not what it was. The collapse of neo-Kantianism in France in the 1930s and the rise of what the French called 'les trois H' (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) produced two generations of stunning intellectual brilliance. In the first generation, one thinks of Levinas, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Bataille, and Blanchot. In the second generation, one thinks of Althusser, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, and Kristéva. But while Derrida is still very much going strong, and there is plenty of interesting philosophical work going on (in particular the renaissance of French moral and political philosophy) and an intriguing renewal of phenomenology, one has the impression that none of this is exactly going to set the world alight.

Of course, this poses problems for the usual idea of Continental philosophy. The once-justified professional insider rationale was that there was a philosophical tradition extending from German idealism and romanticism, through to phenomenology, hermeneutics, and the Frankfurt School, which was either forgotten, suppressed, or simply ignored by the dominant analytic approach. In this sense, and with a gesture that is utterly English, and which can be traced back to Mill and Arnold, it is a question of importing foreign prince(sse)s from over the water, of illuminating the dour utilitarianism of the island with a little Continental sweetness and light. But Continental philosophy itself, as I understand it and have tried to explain it, faces two substantial problems: first, as already indicated, there is not *that* much interesting work going on across the Channel; and second, much of the tradition that was ignored is now being interestingly read and used by analytically trained philosophers who are working on the ground prepared by philosophers like Taylor, Cavell, and Rorty.

To one ruminating in a millennial mood, it is unclear quite what the future holds philosophically, if anything at all. But to look on the bright side, I would like to conclude the book with a couple of possible remedies for the present situation. Let's go back to where my story started, with Kant. Kant summarized the project of Enlightenment in the words *sapere aude*, which might be

freely rendered: *dare to think for yourself*. That is, Continental philosophers cannot, and in my view, should not, expect any new prince(sse)s from over the water. We cannot expect to import the next grand Continental paradigm from Frankfurt, Paris, or wherever.

We have to think for ourselves philosophically, which is, of course, an extremely hazardous business. But I think such work is beginning and I would even say that there is emerging, in Britain and elsewhere in the English-speaking world, a genuine and non-sectarian recurrence of interest in deep philosophical issues informed by both major traditions, and a sense that these issues must be addressed to local conditions and learn to speak the dialect of the place and the language of the tribe. Part of the problem is that Continental philosophy has been reduced to a list of proper names, with various competing methodologies attached, that one could survey with enthusiasm, bewilderment, or indifference during one or a series of introductory courses, or by reading books like this one. In my view, it is no longer a question of worshipping a series of proper names, but of *doing something* with what they left behind; doing creative, inventive thematic work and not restricting oneself to translation and commentary.

Philosophy must be clearly argued conceptual creation in critical relation to given traditions of thinking, and not a melancholic mourning for missed opportunities or a mere technique for sharpening one's common sense.

As I have tried to show, the current divisions in the study of philosophy are a consequence of certain more or less inadequate professional selfdescriptions. Both Continental and analytic philosophy are, to a great extent, sectarian self- descriptions that are the consequence of the professionalization of the discipline, a process that has led to the weakening of philosophy's critical function and its emancipatory intent, and to its progressive marginalization in the life of culture. As such, to borrow Rorty's word, the distinction has become tiresome.

The story I have tried to tell in this book is how this distinction can be related back to a more interesting historical picture where analytic and Continental philosophy can be viewed as vital expressions of the problem of 'the two cultures': scientific explanation versus humanistic interpretation, empirical- scientific-

Benthamite-Carnapian versus hermeneutic-romantic-Coleridgean-Heideggerian. My claim has been that when this cultural situation is not properly understood, then we risk getting stuck in a rather fruitless, and indeed pernicious, stand-off between scientism on the one hand, and obscurantism on the other. To understand aright the two-cultures problem in philosophy we have to understand the divergent paths that philosophy took after Kant and the different problems that came to define it. I have tried to sketch the Continental side of the story by focusing on the theme of the crisis of reason after Kant and describing the problematic of nihilism that this provokes. My hope is that once this story has become clear and we have learned to overcome any lingering sectarianism, then we might begin to move on philosophically and face up to issues of deep and enduring intellectual interest, such as those concerned with the gap between knowledge and wisdom.

Finally, this is what I want to offer as the promise of philosophy, as a promise that can hopefully be kept: that philosophy might form an essential part in the life of a culture, in how a culture converses with itself and with other cultures.

Philosophy is that moment of critical reflection in a specific context, where human beings are invited to analyse the world in which they find themselves, and to question what passes for common sense in the particular society in which they live by raising questions of the most general form: 'What is justice?', 'What is love?', 'What is the meaning of life?'. Even more crudely stated, the hope is that the various considerations to which such questions give rise can, through enquiry and argumentation, have an educative, emancipatory effect. As Stanley Cavell notes, philosophy is the education of grown-ups. But this should hardly be news, as it is a description of philosophy that would not have surprised Socrates.

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Academic philosophers tend to work with an implicit philosophy of mind when they address their own intellectual production. They presume that ideas, or at least their own, are forged in an independent thoughtscape untainted by the sullied struggles of material history, social conflict or the sordid aspects of their own psychologies and private lives. Freely generated within the established protocols of logic, argumentation, hermeneutics or historical analysis, philosophic ideas are thus assumed to be the products of pristine and rigorous minds.

This top-down view of professional philosophers' theoretical production favors a specific set of responses to the question of the relationship between continental and analytic philosophy. Individual thinkers often presume that they can or should simply define these terms and the true nature of their relationship, either by asserting that they are essentially different, fundamentally compatible, or that particular differences or similarities should be either overcome or maintained. Relying on the metaphilosophical presumption of a privileged intellectual vantage point from which these two 'ideas' of philosophy and their relation can be definitively defined, such an approach turns a blind eye to the ways in which these terms function as contested social signifiers embedded in concrete theoretical practices and deep material histories, which are not susceptible to suddenly changing due to the bombastic, self-aggrandizing fiat of individuals.

What, then, if we were to take things the other way around? Instead of having philosophers survey the theoretical landscape from their purportedly elevated vantage point and myopically lay claim to the supposed nature of ongoing practices and fraught struggles, what if we began with the latter in order to demonstrate the extent to which the former was, in fact, only a resultant, a historical residue that has all too quickly forgotten its own historicity? This would mean that 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy—rather than being categories for a free and independent mind to define and compare—would be understood as theoretical practices inscribed within the deep history of institutions of knowledge production, which have actually forged the supposedly free and independent minds of philosophers.

This does not mean in the least that we are destined to perpetuate these practices. On the contrary, it is precisely by unearthing their socio-historical, cultural and political constitution that we can denaturalize them and gain leverage over them. Indeed, the transformation of theoretical practices requires a long and arduous descent from the privileged tower of the isolated mind, with its apparently expansive visibility, into the dark dungeons of thought upon which it was built. This anti-Platonic descent into the cavernous underworld of the foundations of 'pure thinking' is part of what I have undertaken in books like *Logique de l'histoire* and *Interventions in Contemporary Thought*.

Since this is not the place to enter into details, let us simply note that what is today generally called 'continental philosophy' can perhaps best be understood—at least for the purposes of this heuristic preliminary sketch—as a theoretical practice that emerged with the institutionalization of philosophy in the modern European university since approximately the end of the 18th century. In the context of the rising power of the natural sciences, and later the social sciences, as well as the partial demise of certain metaphysical givens and social hierarchies, philosophy turned to its own textual past in order to legitimate itself as a university discipline with a unique set of hermeneutic and historical skills. In the time stretching approximately from Hegel to Heidegger, it established and consolidated what is now known as the canon of European philosophy, with its purported birth in ancient Greece, its characteristic modern turn around Descartes, and its contemporary moment defined by the Whiggish gaze of the author telling the story.

What is called 'analytic philosophy' emerged approximately a century later. In an institutional endeavor to align itself on the natural sciences, it sought, among other things, to transform philosophical analysis into a scientifically rigorous discourse. Distancing itself from the intricate complexities and ambiguities of textual and historical interpretation, it has attempted to elevate itself through the constitution of a pristine world of exact positions, transparent descriptions, logical arguments and rational reconstruction.

Material practices such as these are not reducible to simple ideas that could be the private property of individual philosophers who define them for themselves. They are the common property of those who have inherited them, as well as the institutions of which they are a part. It is only by subjecting the illusion of the private property of ideas to critique, and descending into the cavernous underground of material history, that we can begin the arduous labor of concrete understanding and material transformation.

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Lors de mon cursus de philosophie à la Sorbonne dans les années 1990, j'avais été étonné de voir que le programme de philosophie était largement basé sur une sorte de canon d'auteurs classiques - Platon, Descartes, Kant notamment à qui l'on pouvait ajouter Aristote, Spinoza ou Hegel - mais qu'une partie non négligeable de la philosophie (que je ne connaissais pas encore sous le nom de « philosophie analytique ») y était fort peu enseignée. J'ai progressivement décidé de transformer cet étonnement initial en enquête sur les réceptions de cette philosophie en France. J'y ai été guidé par la lecture de Jacques Bouveresse, auteur de référence pour moi (cf. *Why I am so Unfrench and Other Essays*, Collège de France Edition, 2013). Mon sujet s'est brutalement incarné lors d'un échange assez violent avec un anthropologue d'un certain âge, agrégé de philosophie, qui m'avait déclaré qu'à son époque « on n'avait pas besoin de lire Russell ou Wittgenstein pour savoir que ça n'avait aucun intérêt ». J'y ai vu le fil rouge de mon travail : comment pouvait-on avoir une telle certitude... sans même ouvrir un de leurs livres ?

J'ai parcouru des archives, réalisé des entretiens, je me suis beaucoup appuyé sur les travaux de Pascal Engel aussi, et j'ai petit à petit découvert à quel point les logiques disciplinaires de la philosophie en France (autour d'un groupe restreint d'auteurs canoniques) tendaient à construire une sorte d'habitus intellectuel national (Norbert Elias) particulièrement rétif aux principes de la philosophie analytique (cf. « La difficile réception de la philosophie analytique en France », *Revue d'Histoire des Sciences Humaines*, n°11, 2004, p. 69-99). J'y décrivais comment la formation philosophique, encore de nos jours, me semblait en très forte adéquation avec ce qu'écrivait Halbwachs dans son introduction à *L'évolution pédagogique en France* d'Emile Durkheim : « Comme l'a remarqué Durkheim, les hommes de la Renaissance, par hostilité vis-à-vis de la scolastique, n'ont pas retenu de l'enseignement médiéval ce qui méritait d'en être conservé, le souci d'une forte culture logique, et ont ainsi frayé les voies à une culture purement littéraire, gréco-latine, qui cherche à former surtout des écrivains diserts, des maîtres d'éloquence, des causeurs mondains ».

Est-ce toujours le cas aujourd'hui ? On ne peut nier que des évolutions ont eu lieu : Russell et Wittgenstein font à certains égards partie des auteurs dorénavant classiques, mais il n'en demeure pas moins que la marque de la « grandeur philosophique » reste toujours attachée à des figures intellectuelles capables de disserter avec brio (mais tout ce qui brille n'est pas d'or) d'à peu près tous les sujets, notamment politiques. La fascination pour les auteurs obscurs me semble toujours aussi grande. Pour ne prendre qu'une figure particulièrement antithétique par rapport aux idéaux analytiques de clarté démonstrative, Heidegger reste un auteur majeur aux yeux de nombre d'intellectuels français ce qui justifie que le Seuil en propose de nouvelles traductions. Or comme le soulignent des journalistes qui les interrogent sur ce choix : « Longtemps, celui-ci a joui d'une influence considérable auprès d'auteurs aussi variés que Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Foucault, Derrida et tant d'autres. Mais depuis trente ans, son nom est entaché par le débat sur son nazisme et son antisémitisme » (<https://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/idees/20170419.OBS8205/pourquoi-nous-publions-heidegger-aujourd-hui-le-seuil-s-explique.html>). Je crois que le cas Heidegger est emblématique et symptomatique de la fracture entre les deux cultures philosophiques, analytique et continentale, qui perdure en France (cf. Michel Baudouin, « Heidegger selon Arendt, ou le portrait d'un nazi en penseur post-moderne », *Biens Symboliques, Symbolic Goods*, n°1, à paraître).

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According to a popular saying, people who deny that any difference remains between the political right and the political left always turn out to belong to the political right. Similarly, in my experience, philosophers who say that the continental/analytic divide is far behind us usually reveal continental, rather than analytic sympathies. Aside from that, it seems to me that it is still quite easy to tell an analytic philosophical text from a continental one, not just on the basis of "external" features (hosting publication, originating institution, form of presentation, etc.) but on grounds of philosophical content and style. To be sure, some continental philosophers have been mentioning and occasionally discussing, more often than they were -say- 40 years ago, views originating in analytic philosophy (the reciprocal is much less frequent). This may be an effect of increased presence and prestige of analytic philosophy on the European continent, and more generally in continental-dominated geographic areas. However, in continental literature analytic views are rarely taken seriously. Sometimes, they are made the subject of deliberate "misreading" or metaphorical interpretation; or they are quoted in support of some philosophical thesis that has entirely independent origins and motivation; or they are challenged, not on argumentative grounds but as the expression of some despicable attitude or conception (often on the basis of utter misunderstanding). This is why continental discussion or criticism of analytic-originated views is seldom of interest for analytic philosophers (symmetrically, analytic use of continental materials, while infrequent, is mostly regarded as childish, based on oversimplification, and lacking depth and context).

This already provides part of my answer to the second question. I shall interpret it as "Is it possible to bridge the analytic/continental divide? (and, if so, is it a good idea to try?)". For it seems to me that "bridging the divide" is certainly not necessary. Both communities are thriving, each in its own way: continental philosophers are selling a lot of books (comparatively, of course), and have much greater influence (again, comparatively) on the rest of culture, the media, and the educated public. Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, has been spreading in the academia more than ever before: while preserving control of the most prestigious profession-

al journals and of many important departments in the Anglo-American world, it is now well represented in continental Europe, in the East, and in Latin America. On the other hand, there is no denying that, in principle, both analytic and continental philosophers *could* profit from reading one another: philosophy is being done on both sides, and it would be silly for both the analytic and the continental to rule out the very possibility that any of it may be good philosophy. The reason they don't read one another (and probably won't - not in the immediate future, anyway) is, in a sense, the same in both cases. It is connected with the intense professionalization of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers are simply too busy keeping up with the ever more exacting demands of their profession; furthermore, such demands prominently involve specialization, hence the narrowing of each philosopher's philosophical focus (and competence). Continental philosophical writings are generally too broad in scope to contribute to hyper-specialized research; moreover, most of their content lies beyond the (severe) limits of each analytic philosopher's competence. On the other hand, obviously, hyper-specialized research is hardly accessible to the average continental philosopher (indeed, it is hardly accessible to anybody but the specialists themselves). I believe hyper-specialization to be a problem for analytic philosophy itself, not just for continental philosophers who might be interested (see D.Marconi, *Il mestiere di pensare* ["Thinking as a Trade"], Einaudi 2014). If we succeeded in addressing it, then perhaps some sort of cross-fertilization might develop.

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Dans un livre intitulé *Philosophie contemporaine* (Presses universitaires de France, Paris 2008), je fais reposer la distinction entre philosophie continentale et philosophie analytique sur deux séries de caractéristiques :

Philosophes analytiques	Philosophes continentaux
Primat de l'argumentation	Primat des « visions »
Caractère direct des problématiques	Caractère oblique et historique des problématiques
Clarté, précision et minutie	Profondeur, largeur de vue et globalité
Littéralité des formulations	Recours à la métaphore, effort stylistique
Visée aléthique de la philosophie	Visée interprétative de la philosophie

Cette distinction recouvre des *prétentions philosophiques* distinctes des philosophes, et des attitudes intellectuelles opposées de leurs auditeurs, en particulier les étudiants, et de leurs lecteurs. Elle n'est ainsi ni géographique ni linguistique ; et il existe autre chose en philosophie que ces deux pôles : de la philosophie ni analytique ni continentale.

Qu'attend-on de la philosophie ? Des arguments, des raisons claires, discutables, des vérités ? On est alors plutôt du côté analytique. Attend-on des visions, des perspectives historiques, des interprétations globales ? On est alors plutôt du côté continental ? Que veut-on en faisant de la philosophie ? Mieux comprendre des idées correctement définies et fournir à un auditeur ou un lecteur des raisons contrôlables, même si le résultat est finalement limité on est analytique. Cherche-t-on à offrir une profondeur de pensée, un émoi littéraire, voire un frisson métaphysique ou, tout au contraire, radicalement sceptique ? On est continental.

L'alternative se retrouve à chaque époque. Aristote, saint Thomas, Duns Scot, Descartes ou Kant sont des philosophes analytiques. Une liste de philosophes continentaux, en comprenant de chaque époque,

pourrait aussi être établie. Nos attentes philosophiques nous font nous tourner vers des philosophes d'une liste ou de l'autre. Notre façon de comprendre les philosophes du passé place aussi un philosophe sur une liste ou sur une autre. Après tout, on peut lire Plotin comme un philosophe analytique ou Aristote comme un philosophe continental.

La philosophie analytique peut être aussi caricaturale et creuse que la philosophie continentale. Elle joue avec les thèses et les arguments, comme on se contorsionne et fait des acrobaties. La technicité analytique, parfois vaine, est cependant moins trompeuse que la fausse profondeur.

Du reste, ce qui caractérise la philosophie, depuis cent ans, c'est n'est pas la distinction entre analytique ou continental mais l'accroissement exponentiel du nombre de philosophes : toujours plus d'étudiants, de professeurs, d'écrits, dans toujours plus de livres et de revues, avec un « grand public » à séduire qui s'accroît. La philosophie est devenue un sport de masse. On la trouvait dans des cénacles choisis et dans des bibliothèques, elle a aujourd'hui des magazines, des émissions de radio et de télévision ! Et la philosophie continentale, mieux à même de plaire aux amateurs, a sur l'analytique un net avantage de diffusion.

Y a-t-il (encore) une distinction entre la philosophie continentale et la philosophie analytique ? Oui, elle existe encore. Elle n'est pas historique, mais correspond à ces deux sortes d'attitudes intellectuelles, inconciliables, s'agissant de savoir « ce que veut la philosophie et ce qu'on peut attendre d'elle », pour parler comme Jacques Bouveresse. Est-il nécessaire de dépasser cette distinction entre les deux attitudes ? Non. On peut craindre qu'une prétendue conciliation, recommandée parfois au nom de la tolérance ou de l'ouverture d'esprit, ne ferait finalement qu'ajouter à la confusion des esprits.

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The Analytic-Continental divide has no doubt narrowed since the end of the twentieth century and is currently much more blurred and nuanced than it was. Some Continental philosophers no longer ignore the major contributions to metaphysics and the philosophy of language coming from within the Analytic tradition. A vibrant trend in America reintroduces such traditionally neglected or scorned philosophers as Hegel and Heidegger into the core curriculum, and as a result, the (implicit or explicit) background of contemporary philosophical writing in English is presently being reshaped. Indeed, inner changes within each tradition, regarding the content of the questions asked and the methods applied for answering them, are in the course of creating a new space, in which the issue of the divide would probably seem irrelevant, obsolete. It has already become harder to label some new efforts as either 'analytic' or 'Continental', and the classification may simply reflect an automatic instinct, based almost entirely on geographical and linguistic identities.

However, I believe that we can locate two areas where the divide is still strongly felt. The first is actually no area at all; it is a meta-area. I am thinking here mainly of questions about the limits and margins of philosophy: the natural manner in which sociological, psychological, theological and aesthetical theories find their way into some of the contemporary Continental writings is still totally foreign to the Analytic conception of philosophy as a discipline. This meta-philosophical difference is expressed also in the style of writing. While contemporary Analytic philosophers cling, by and large, to the traditional insistence on a what they conceive as a "clear" style, some Continental philosophers still keep the literary gist that characterized so strongly French writing in the second half of the twentieth century - the style of writing which, in the footsteps of Deleuze and Guattari, we can label 'minor literature'.

The other area where the divide persists is political philosophy. A kind of radicalism that characterizes some Continental political writing is totally absent from the Anglo-American scene. I am thinking, e.g., of the philosophies of Agamben and Virilio, and before them, those of Rancière and Badiou. Although Marxist or anarchist traits are salient and important for the philosophers I have just

mentioned, and this is not incidental, the breach does not concern a particular position in political philosophy, but rather the overall approach to the topic. One could say, perhaps, that such Continental philosophers think of political philosophy as First Philosophy, whereas a similar stand can nowhere be seen in the Analytic scene. This position is crucial, for it entails significant consequences for the kind of truth sought by philosophers, the way judgements are reached, and philosophical responsibility and commitment are formed and expressed. Thus, the two "areas" I am referring to here are actually intimately linked and express the same refusal to be dissolved, or translated, into the conservatism characterizing Analytic language.

Sadly, it is my impression that this kind of radicalism - in content and in style - is gradually being washed away and that contemporary European philosophers tend more and more towards conservatism in both respects. But I am not writing my contribution in the capacity of a prophet. I certainly hope I am wrong. Time will tell.

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Personne ne pourrait nier sérieusement l'existence de la distinction, appréhendable à de multiples niveaux : celui de la lutte pour les positions universitaires, des réseaux scientifiques, des auteurs considérés comme classiques, du style d'écriture philosophique voire de la langue utilisée. C'est un fait qu'on doit bien se résoudre à constater : il existe au moins deux communautés qui, tout en ne se parlant pratiquement pas entre elles, revendiquent pour elles l'exercice de la philosophie. Et pourtant, malgré la force de cette évidence, elle reste un point aveugle de la réflexion philosophique, un pur *faktum*, dont aucune des deux communautés ne parvient à rendre raison, comme si l'écart entre les deux traditions était devenu tel que non seulement on ne pouvait plus s'entendre sur la bonne manière de faire de la philosophie (ce qui, sans doute, est une constante dans l'histoire de la philosophie), mais qu'on ne pouvait même plus comprendre ce qui nous séparait exactement, ni formuler précisément les termes de l'opposition (il ne s'agit pas des objets de recherche, pas non

Un tel état de fait, pourtant, devrait être comme une écharde dans la chair du philosophe : comment la philosophie, discipline réflexive par excellence, science des principes, pourrait-elle accepter de reposer sur une telle contingence ? La vérité philosophique peut-elle être au bout du compte affaire de tradition, de culture voire de préférence personnelle (rigueur et scientificité des "analytiques" contre profondeur et sensibilité littéraire des "continentaux") ? Des tentatives existent bien pour délimiter les compétences de l'une et de l'autre de ces branches philosophiques, mais parce qu'elles émergent toujours d'un côté, elles ne satisfont jamais entièrement l'autre, qui ne s'y reconnaît pas. En outre, la diversité interne à chacune de ces traditions est bien plus grande que ne le soupçonne l'autre : c'est seulement pour les "analytiques" que la philosophie continentale existe comme unité, et vice-versa.

Que faire ? Sans doute n'a-t-on d'autre choix, aujourd'hui, que de ne pas accepter les termes du problème tel qu'il est posé, de ne pas partir du fait de la distinction et de s'intéresser aux problèmes philosophiques, à la chose, en suivant la voie de ceux que Bergson appelle les «grands optimistes», qui est de "commencer

par supposer résolu le problème à résoudre" (Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 306). Cette époque méthodologique d'un fait pourtant indubitable est peut-être la condition de toute ambition philosophique universelle. Elle n'est pas une exigence seulement négative, puisqu'elle suppose aussi de croire qu'il existe une communauté plus basique et plus unitaire des problèmes philosophiques, l'unité non pas de nos questions, mais des choses, et des questions qu'elles nous posent et que nous avons à formuler. Dans cette confrontation aux choses, cette exigence méthodologique implique de se familiariser avec les textes, le style voire les outils logiques de la tradition adverse.

Elle suppose aussi de ne pas décider a priori du critère de la scientificité d'un texte philosophique. Il s'agit là d'un point au cœur du malentendu. Il est de fait, me semble-t-il, que lorsqu'ils prennent la peine de lire quelques analytiques, les continentaux sont plus enclins à les prendre au sérieux qu'ils ne le sont eux-mêmes par leurs collègues de l'autre bord. À quoi cela tient-il ? Sans doute à ce que la philosophie analytique s'entoure d'un appareil formel plus conséquent et plus codifié que la philosophie continentale. La conséquence de cela, c'est que ne fait pas de la philosophie analytique qui veut : il faut avoir des notions de logique, et parfois de logique formelle. L'entrée en philosophie analytique est plus coûteuse qu'en philosophie continentale, et la technicité est un rempart solide contre l'imposture. Certains articles de philosophie analytique ne disent pas grand chose, mais au moins disent-ils toujours quelque chose, parce que l'armature logique de leur argumentation les protège de ne parler de rien (depuis les critiques de Carnap contre Heidegger, la tradition analytique est hantée par ce danger). Il faut reconnaître que ce n'est pas le cas en philosophie continentale : parce qu'elle met un point d'honneur à conserver, pour la philosophie, le langage naturel, rien ne la préserve immédiatement de la supercherie. Il nous arrive en effet de parler pour ne rien dire. Toutefois, l'absence d'un critère a priori ou d'un seuil nettement délimité, permettant de faire le départ entre bonne et mauvaise philosophie, ne signifie pas qu'il n'y ait pas de critère du tout, ni de différence entre bonne et mauvaise philosophie continentale. L'argument sorite est tout aussi sophistiqué en

philosophie qu'ailleurs : du caractère nécessairement vague de la limite, on ne peut pas déduire l'absence de limite. Inversement, ce n'est pas parce que la limite est bien nette, que tout ce qui se trouve du bon côté vaut la peine d'être lu : d'où le découragement de certains continentaux devant la vacuité de certains articles d'auteurs analytiques reconnus. Il faudra donc admettre de ne pas posséder a priori les critères de la bonne philosophie, accepter le risque de la supercherie, et l'effort de la démasquer autrement qu'en lui appliquant, de l'extérieur, des catégories logiques auxquelles sa rationalité propre lui demande de rester étrangère.

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Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Φιλοσοφίας της Επιστήμης

Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

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Παρατηρείται συχνά πως είναι πολύ δύσκολο να προσδιοριστούν ασφαλή κριτήρια για την σαφή διαφοροποίηση της αναλυτικής από την ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία. Θα μπορούσαμε, σχηματοποιώντας σε σημαντικό βαθμό την θεώρηση της ιστορίας της φιλοσοφίας από τα τέλη του 19^{ου} αιώνα μέχρι τις μέρες μας, να συνοψίσουμε τα συνήθως χρησιμοποιούμενα κριτήρια ή ομάδες κριτηρίων ως εξής:

- I. γεωγραφικά και ιστορικά στοιχεία που αναφέρονται στην ανάπτυξη και στην εξέλιξη ορισμένων φιλοσοφικών τάσεων, αφενός στις Αγγλόφωνες χώρες, ξεκινώντας από τη Μεγάλη Βρετανία, και στη Σκανδιναβία, αφετέρου στην Γερμανία, τη Γαλλία, αλλά και την Ιταλία.
- II. ζητήματα φιλοσοφικού περιεχομένου, θεωρίες και συγκεκριμένες τοποθετήσεις, ενδιαφέροντα, θεματικές προτεραιότητες και γενικότερες στάσεις, όπως, μεταξύ άλλων, τρόποι αντιμετώπισης της μεταφυσικής παράδοσης και των σχέσεων μεταξύ φιλοσοφίας και ιστορίας της φιλοσοφίας, και θέσεις όπως ρεαλισμός και αντιρεαλισμός, φυσιοκρατία και μη φυσιοκρατικές αντιλήψεις.
- III. οι υιοθετούμενες μέθοδοι, με την ευρύτερη και τη στενότερη σημασία του όρου, όπως διαφορετικές συλλήψεις και προσεγγίσεις φιλοσοφικών προβλημάτων, αξιοποίηση ή, αντίθετα, υποτίμηση και αποφυγή ιστορικών προσεγγίσεων, έμφαση στη χρήση λογικών τεχνικών και φορμαλισμού στην ανασυγκρότηση της φιλοσοφικής επιχειρηματολογίας ή, από την άλλη πλευρά, κριτική της υπερβολικής εξάρτησης από την λογική, συστηματική επιδίωξη της προσεκτικής ανάλυσης της γλώσσας, με αναγωγή σε κάποια βαθιά δομή ή και στις ποικίλες κοινές χρήσεις των λέξεων για την μελέτη της σκέψης, σε αντιπαράθεση με την φαινομενολογία, την ερμηνευτική, τη γενεαλογία και την αποδόμηση θεωριών και εννοιών.
- IV. το ύφος, που μπορεί να σχετίζεται με την διασφάλιση της αυστηρότητας, της συνοχής και της σαφήνειας, με στόχο τον καλύτερο έλεγχο της εγκυρότητας και της ορθότητας των επιχειρημάτων, ή, από τη σκοπιά της ηπειρωτικής θεώρησης, με την αναζήτηση της βαθύτητας, της πρωτοτυπίας και της δημιουργικότητας.

- V. η ανάδειξη επιστημικών/γνωστικών ή οιονεί επιστημικών αρχών του φιλοσοφείν, σε αντιδιαστολή με αισθητικές και, ειδικότερα, λογοτεχνικές κανονιστικές αρχές που φαίνεται να καθορίζουν σε σημαντικό βαθμό και την επιλογή μεθόδων και ύφους.

Εξετάζοντας αυτά τα κριτήρια, δεν αργεί κανείς να καταλάβει πως είναι μάταιη η αναζήτηση αναγκαίων και επαρκών συνθηκών που θα αντιστοιχούσαν σε κάποια ουσία της αναλυτικής ή την ηπειρωτικής αντίληψης του φιλοσοφείν. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, ακόμη και αν τα διαφορετικά κριτήρια δεν παραπέμπουν σε αναγκαίες και επαρκείς συνθήκες μπορεί να αποκαλύπτουν οικογενειακές ομοιότητες που συνδέουν τα μέλη μερικών αλλά όχι όλων ανεξαιρέτως των σχολών ή τάσεων των δύο φιλοσοφικών «στρατοπέδων». Οι ομοιότητες αυτές προκύπτουν και καθιερώνονται ως διακριτικά γνωρίσματα μέσα από την περίπλοκη ιστορία συγκρότησης ομάδων και συνομαδώσεων φιλοσόφων. Γι' αυτό και είναι νομίζω εύστοχη η πρόταση του Χανς-Γιόχαν Γκλοκ να εννοήσουμε τα χαρακτηριστικά της αναλυτικής φιλοσοφίας ως ένα πλέγμα οικογενειακών ομοιοτήτων και ιστορικών δεσμών επίδρασης που συνδέουν συγκεκριμένους φιλοσόφους με διαφορετικούς τρόπους.

Πολλοί στις μέρες μας παρατηρούν πως η διαμάχη τείνει να ξεπεραστεί και πως υπάρχει προσέγγιση των εκπροσώπων των δύο παραδόσεων. Πιστεύω, κατ' αρχήν, ότι μπορούμε να εκλάβουμε το ύφος και το ήθος των δύο παραδόσεων αντίστοιχα ως ενδεικτικά στοιχεία των ρυθμιστικών ιδεών διαφορετικών, γόνιμων τρόπων του φιλοσοφείν που μπορούν να συγκλίνουν. Υποστηρίζω πως η αναλυτική παράδοση, νοούμενη υπό μια ευρεία έννοια, έχει αναπτύξει σημαντικές αρετές, οι οποίες συνοψίζονται στη λογική αυστηρότητα στην επιχειρηματολογία, την ακρίβεια και τη σαφήνεια στο ύφος γραφής και κυρίως την προσήλωση σε βαθύτερες κανονιστικές αρχές ορθολογικότητας και ελεγκσιμότητας. Από αυτές τις αρετές μπορούν νομίζω να επωφεληθούν και οι αντίπαλοί της όταν θέλουν να αναδείξουν καλύτερα, να καταστήσουν διαυγείς και να υποστηρίξουν τις ίδιες τους τις τοποθετήσεις. Δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι ο Ρίτσαρντ Ρόρτυ, ένας φιλόσοφος αναθρεμμένος μέσα στην αναλυτική παράδοση, την πολεμά αποτελεσματικότερα από άλλους με τα δικά της όπλα. Ωστόσο, δεν αμφιβάλλω ότι και οι αναλυτικοί έχουν να διδαχθούν πολλά από τους ηπειρωτικούς, εμπλουτίζοντας τον θεματικό τους ορίζοντα, συνειδητοποιώντας την ιστορική διάσταση της προβληματικής τους, και αναπτύσσοντας μεγαλύτερη υπαρξιακή, πολιτισμική και πολιτική ευαισθησία που προοδευτικά θα

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αντανακλώνται όλο και περισσότερο και στις δικές τους αναζητήσεις. Εκείνο που εξακολουθώ να δυσκολεύομαι να εκτιμήσω είναι η φιλοσοφική αξία της πρόσφατης «μεταμοντέρνας» εξέλιξης της ηπειρωτικής παράδοσης, καθώς και η λειτουργικότητα κειμένων χαρακτηριζόμενων από ένα σκοτεινό και υπερβολικά ρητορικό ύφος που προσποιείται τη βαθύτητα. Φιλόσοφοι, όπως ο Αλαιν Μπαντιού και ο Σλαβόι Ζιζεκ αποτελούν κατά τη γνώμη μου πρότυπα προς αποφυγή!

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La philosophie dite analytique est issue d'une tradition inaugurée, en particulier, par Frege, Moore et Russell, puis Wittgenstein, suivis par Carnap et bien d'autres, au début du siècle dernier. Il est vrai qu'elle s'est distinguée d'une autre tradition dite continentale issue de Hegel, Heidegger ou Nietzsche. Nous gardons à l'esprit les propos de Russell au sujet de l'idéalisme allemand qui «l'étouffait» ou encore ceux de Carnap dans ses critiques de Hegel, Heidegger ou même Descartes, ainsi que la mise à l'écart par Wittgenstein dans le *Tractatus* des discours sans attache empirique.

Le qualificatif de «analytique» revient à Frege et concerne sa méthode logiciste qui consiste à analyser le discours arithmétique pour en montrer le fondement logique. Cette même méthode a été étendue par Russell aux mathématiques, puis à la théorie de la connaissance sous la forme du réductionnisme. Wittgenstein avait critiqué Frege, Russell et Peano pour avoir limité leur méthode au logicisme sans songer à l'appliquer à d'autres discours en rapport avec le réel. C'est par la logique qu'il résolut les problèmes du *Tractatus* concernant la manière dont le langage représente le réel. Carnap présenta pour sa part une méthode permettant de construire logiquement le monde. Ces deux auteurs peuvent être considérés comme étant les représentants les plus orthodoxes de la philosophie analytique.

Le terme «analytique» n'est toutefois pas perçu comme étant le plus satisfaisant, il trace juste les perspectives d'une philosophie extrêmement variée et évolutive et qui consiste à travailler sur le langage par le moyen d'une analyse rigoureuse en se distinguant à la fois de la phénoménologie et de la linguistique. La philosophie analytique se caractérise d'une manière très générale par son refus des discours à caractère spéculatif, par sa distinction des sciences tout en se voulant scientifique et par l'application de la méthode d'analyse du discours. Elle serait alors censée s'opposer à la philosophie dite continentale par ces caractéristiques.

Il faut tout d'abord remarquer que le qualificatif de «continental» comme opposé à «analytique» n'est pas tout à fait justifié étant donné que bien des philosophes dits analytiques viennent du continent,

y compris, Frege à qui on doit le nouvel usage du terme en tant que signifiant «fondé logiquement».

Mais Hegel et surtout Kant n'étaient-ils pas également en quête de fondements? Par ailleurs, la phénoménologie de Husserl n'a-t-elle pas pris racine dans l'antipsychologisme de Brentano tout comme Frege, Moore..., leurs chemins ayant divergé par la suite?

Selon Austin (1950), malgré quelques points communs au départ, les deux philosophies «ont les pieds sur des sols différents» et il est peu probable qu'elles puissent se rejoindre. « Peut-être le temps aidant, réussirons nous à nous rapprocher peu à peu». Le temps a-t-il réussi à rapprocher les deux philosophies?

La distinction entre philosophie d'inspiration analytique et la philosophie continentale doit être maintenue mais peut-être avec un nouveau regard que Wittgenstein a permis de jeter dans ses réflexions post-*Tractatus*. En effet, la philosophie analytique est devenue moins «idéalisée» dans le sens wittgensteinien du terme, c'est-à-dire que les règles régissant notre langage ne sont pas «stipulables» à la manière dont le sont celles de la logique, d'une part et qu'elle s'intéresse à toute sorte de problème philosophique, d'autre part, en pratiquant une méthode qui privilégie l'analyse rigoureuse, la discussion et l'argumentation.

La distinction entre les deux pensées, issues de traditions différentes, ne peut être évincée. Elle consiste en deux méthodes différentes d'approche des questions philosophiques, dont la plus efficace a plus de chance d'être partagée et retenue, comme c'est le cas pour les théories scientifiques,.

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Although the boundaries between analytic and continental philosophy are sometimes fuzzy (both originate in Austrian and German philosophy), there is indeed a distinction between their respective problems, styles, methods and focus, which anyone can verify by e.g. applying to university jobs. It would be desirable to overcome it, if philosophers could be aware of what goes on in the other side. But it is not desirable if it means producing a kind of philosophy which is sloppy, scornful of the ideals of reason, and mostly anti-theoretical.

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Analytic philosophy is a tradition that philosophers belong to in virtue of taking certain texts to be canonical (such as those of Frege, Russell, Kripke, and so on), certain patterns of citation to be mandatory, and certain aims or values as central (such as argumentative rigor, clarity of writing, and so on). Membership in the analytic tradition is a matter of degree, as is membership in any philosophical tradition. But "continental philosophy" does not label a single tradition of philosophy, but rather indiscriminately groups a variety of different traditions of western philosophy whose main commonality is that they are not the analytic tradition. Since "continental philosophy" is not a label for a single tradition of philosophy, there really is no single thing as the analytic-continental divide. Rather, there are many such divides, corresponding to the different traditions of continental philosophy. These divides exist as reifications of patterns of citation and writing style. (Like all such reifications, they exist, but they exist only in the most superficial way.)

There should be no expectation that each of these divides is equal in width. And it is not clear that each divide is equally important to bridge. The divide between analytical philosophers of mind and phenomenologists is narrow and many bridges crossing it have been already been built. The divide between analytical philosophers of logic and so-called postmodernists is vast, but I see little profit in bridge building here.

In general, what does it mean to ask whether bridge building is necessary? Necessary for what purpose? Necessary for whom?

No one knows for sure what the proper methodology for philosophical inquiry is. Given this, it is probably a good thing that there are different distinctive traditions in philosophy that pursue not only different inquiries but pursue in different ways inquiry. In order for different traditions to thrive, they must exist at some space from each other, and hence it is to be expected that there should be a divide between these traditions. In order for a given tradition to thrive, there must be a critical mass of individuals working primarily within that tradition. In order for progress in philosophy

to stem from this diversity of traditions, some individuals must be willing to carefully and critically examine works from traditions other than their home tradition.

Although I was trained in the analytic tradition, learning from other traditions of philosophy, specifically German Idealism, Anglo-American Idealism, and phenomenology, has greatly improved my own work. However, many philosophers will produce excellent work even while operating wholly within a single tradition. I would be surprised if David Lewis had read deeply any work of philosophy outside of the analytic tradition. Obviously, that did not stop him from producing an exceptionally impressive philosophical system!

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Unfortunately, I think there is still an analytic-continental divide, at least in the Anglophone philosophical world and especially in certain areas of philosophy. The most entrenched aspect of the divide is institutional: the overwhelming majority of universities and journals that are generally regarded as "top tier," especially in the United States, are almost exclusively analytic, and many of them still regard continental philosophy as something other than "real philosophy." The more interesting question may be whether it is necessary to bridge this divide. And here, my answer would be: "it depends."

During a campus visit for a job in the early 1980s, a very famous analytic historian of early modern philosophy said to me that when he read Descartes, he treated Descartes' writings as if he was talking to him in his office; Descartes's problems with the Church, his radical scientific views, and his challenges to scholastic orthodoxy were not, in his view, philosophically relevant. All that mattered was whether the arguments were sound. Needless to say, I didn't get that job. But fortunately, such a view is now as philosophically anachronistic as it was the orthodox view during much of the 20th century. There are many areas within the history of philosophy where the best scholars appreciate and are familiar with research coming out of both the analytic and continental traditions. This is true, for example, of Spinoza scholarship and for many scholars working in ancient philosophy. This is, unfortunately, less true for one of my own areas of expertise - Nietzsche scholarship - where the analytic-continental divide is much more divisive than it was forty years ago. I think this has been unfortunate for both students and scholars interested in Nietzsche's philosophy, and I think scholars on both sides of this divide would be well-served if they were more open to engaging with each other's work.

Another area where one can see the value of bridging the divide is in the recent turn in cognitive science and neuroscience to works in classical phenomenology, primarily those of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. When cognitive science began as a separate area of philosophical research, its practitioners were almost exclusively analytic philosophers, and while they saw the need to know the science in-

volved in thinking about the workings of the mind, they saw no need to explore the philosophical inquiries into consciousness that were at the foundation of continental philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century. This is increasingly no longer the case, as analytically trained cognitive scientists and phenomenologists now frequently read and engage with each other's research.

Where I am less enthusiastic about bridging the divide, and this returns to the institutional reality of the divide, is that for more than a few philosophers and philosophy departments and journals, bridging the divide means that continental philosophers must become more like analytic philosophers: they must spend less time addressing historical context and more time providing arguments; they must cleanse philosophical writing of stylistic excess and bring it down to its logical core; they must publish in the prestigious analytic journals if their work is to be taken seriously and considered worthy of tenure and promotion. If this is what bridging the divide means, then not only is bridging the divide not necessary; it is not even good for philosophy.

I should confess that I am solidly on the continental side, but I should also confess that I received my degrees from universities (Brown and Purdue) that were analytic and pluralist, respectively.

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Pour répondre si brièvement à une question aussi vaste je préfère adopter la forme du témoignage dont j'assume la part de subjectivité et le caractère synthétique.

Lorsque j'ai commencé à pratiquer la philosophie de manière professionnelle au début des années 1970, il y avait très peu de présence de la philosophie anglo-américaine dans les pays francophones. J'y étais sensible car après avoir travaillé dans le cadre de la philosophie allemande et française - spécialement la phénoménologie et l'herméneutique - j'avais adopté une approche de plus en plus critique de celle-ci et je m'étais tourné vers la philosophie anglo-saxonne avec un premier livre sur Wittgenstein (1973-76). À l'époque seuls G.-G. Granger et J. Bouveresse en France s'intéressaient à Wittgenstein. Dans ma thèse de doctorat publiée sous le titre *L'inflation du langage dans la philosophie contemporaine* (1976-1979), je développe une critique des courants philosophiques continentaux dominants prolongeant de façon ambiguë l'idéalisme et l'essentialisme. En même temps, je constate que l'obsession langagière de la philosophie se retrouve - mais en une grande diversité - chez les philosophes créateurs du XXème qu'ils soient anglo-saxons ou européens continentaux (Wittgenstein, les philosophes analytiques Quine inclus, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur, le structuralisme, Derrida, Foucault, etc, etc. Cfr *Pour une métaphilosophie du langage*, 1981). M'intéressant ensuite de plus en plus aux questions éthiques suscitées par les technosciences - en particulier la bioéthique - j'ai retrouvé les mêmes différences d'approche entre le monde anglo-saxon et le monde européen continental. Bien sûr, les choses ont évolué et le panorama philosophique dans les pays francophones est devenu beaucoup plus pluraliste avec des tentatives de rapprochements entre des phénoménologues et des analystes par exemple. La Belgique a d'ailleurs toujours été plus ouverte aux divers courants philosophiques que la France et on perçoit même une différence entre la Belgique flamande plus proche du monde anglo-saxon et la Belgique francophone dépendante de la philosophie française elle-même influencée par la philosophie allemande (du moins au XXème siècle). Sans doute l'opposition entre le monde universitaire anglo-saxon et le monde universitaire français remonte-t-elle au

Moyen Âge lors de la création des premières universités : Oxford et Cambridge plus mathématiciennes, plus expérimentalistes et empiristes, plus nominalistes d'une part et, d'autre part, la Sorbonne plus portée sur les arts du langage, la dialectique, la rhétorique, et les mondes spéculatifs naissants du langage, plus « réaliste » donc au sens de la querelle des universaux. Depuis quelques années je m'intéresse à la problématique transhumaniste (cfr *Le transhumanisme est-il un humanisme ?*, 2014 ; *Philosophie et idéologies trans/posthumanistes*, 2017) d'origine anglaise et davantage représentée dans le monde américain et australien. Et je retrouve les mêmes différences et oppositions de sensibilité et de conceptualisation : d'un côté, l'ouverture pragmatique expérimentaliste avec un sens de l'évolution, de l'autre le poids de l'héritage idéaliste, spiritualiste, essentialiste hostile à la perspective transhumaniste. Tout cela concerne non seulement l'épistémologie mais aussi l'éthique et la politique, ainsi que l'arrière-plan métaphysique et religieux. Mais la diversité n'est pas un mal contrairement à ce que peuvent penser des philosophes essentialistes et idéalistes.

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In our globalized and specialized philosophy, we cannot speak of an «A-C divide» in the sense intended in the central decades of the last century any more. And yet, the distinction still survives, because the underlying problem is still unsolved. Said in a very preliminary way, the problem in my view is that *there is something wrong* or *something is lacking* in each tradition. So it is not the case of preferring one or the other, because both are - for different reasons and to different degrees - 'bad', incomplete philosophy.

In this perspective, some bridge-building might be useful, but we should pay attention, because not any bridge is good: the risk of combining faults and dropping merits cannot be excluded. Dialogue and integration are generally profitable processes; less profitable are mutual 'contaminations', so that one part learns from the bad habits of the other, and ignores the good ones.

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Bal masqué simpliciter. A pragmatist critique of the analytic-continental divide

In a 1978 interview, Michel Foucault described the philosophical horizon within which his thought was formulated, and his Nietzsche-inspired attempt to overcome it.¹ This horizon was delimited by two poles: the philosophy of the subject, dominated by phenomenology and existentialism, and the philosophy of history, dominated by Hegel. Quite independently, Richard Rorty attempted to explicate Foucault's Nietzschean stance (to which he himself ascribed) in very similar terms.² According to Rorty, modern philosophy appears in one of two variations. The first, that of Cartesian metaphysics, is characterised by the attempt to ground things, rules and values (ontological, epistemic and moral) in an ahistorical structure of the subject. The second, that of Hegelian metaphysics, shares the same metaphysical features as the Cartesian viewpoint, despite constituting a critique of it. The founding subject and the world it represents are replaced by a series of successive discourses produced by history. However, since history is now considered to be governed by ahistorical reason, the Hegelian viewpoint amounts to the replacement of one set of metaphysical categories with another.

From Rorty's radically anti-metaphysical, Nietzschean or pragmatist perspective, modern philosophical discourse, despite its self-proclamations to the contrary, must be fundamentally identified with metaphysics. His diagnosis enables us to understand philosophy as, what I would like to call, the hypostatization of the particular. Roughly put, philosophy qua metaphysics proceeds as follows: it takes particular things, as objects of inquiry, as they are at a specific historical moment, usually the present; it removes their specific, his-

1 "Entretien avec Michel Foucault" in DEFERT, Daniel, EWALD, François and LAGRANGE, Jacques (eds.) 2001 (1994), *Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988*, Gallimard (1980, n° 281), 860-914. The interview, a *locus classicus*, was conducted by Trombadori in Paris at the end of 1978. It was first published in *Il Contributo* (January-March 1980, 4th year, n° 1), 23-84, entitled "Conversazione con Michel Foucault".

2 RORTY, Richard 1986, "Foucault and Epistemology" in HOY, David Couzens (ed.) 1986, *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 41-49.

torical context; it engages in further abstractions; and it finally considers the result of this process as non-contingent, ahistorical, or transcendental.

If Rorty is right, it may be more productive to substitute the analytic-continental distinction with a different one, the distinction between metaphysical and pragmatist philosophical practice. Needless to say, I do not wish to claim that the analytic tradition corresponds to the Cartesian pole, while the continental corresponds, perhaps more appropriately, to the Hegelian. Rather, it seems that, whatever criterion we employ to draw the distinction,³ the two traditions will again map on to the two-Cartesian and Hegelian-poles already described. From Rorty's vantage point, both analytic and continental traditions, if they are engaged in the hypostatisation of the particular, amount to variations of metaphysics, and overcoming the distinction would require the pragmatist abandoning of philosophy *qua* metaphysics.

A historicist and contextualist pragmatism could be the therapy. For example, a philosophical approach (in the pragmatist sense) to the topic of, say, friendship would have to proceed bottom-up rather than top-down. Instead of a conceptual analysis that would attempt to specify its ahistorical, necessary and sufficient conditions, it should start from the concreteness of a historically-situated case. This can include the fictional, such as an analysis of the relationship between Levin and Oblonsky in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*. One would need to specify its characteristics, situate it in the context of the nineteenth-century Russian society, compare it with other relationships described within the narrative, and relevant cases in other contexts.

3 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see VIRVIDAKIS, Stelios 2005, "Αναλυτική και ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία: Κριτήρια αναγνώρισης και διάκρισης" in *Neusis* 14, 3-47, and 2016, "On Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide" in SATHA-ANNAND, Suwanna, SIRICHAN, Kanit, and SKAR, Lowell (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Symposium, Philosophies in Dialogue: Bridging the Great Philosophical Divides*, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, 71-84.

It goes without saying that many criticisms can be voiced against the pragmatist picture, both its diagnosis and its therapy: the pragmatist has simply substituted one form of metaphysics with another (let's call it nominalism); or it is far from self-evident that the pragmatist *Übersicht* of a phenomenon, like the example of friendship above, exhausts its meaning. A third criticism—that this approach turns out to be irrelevant to philosophical practice since it situates itself outside of philosophy as we know it—may entail the previous two. It seems, in any event, that by answering the third criticism one would also answer the first two.

I take the pragmatist stance to be clearly relevant to philosophy when it offers an internal critique: when it encourages fellow philosophers to see that she is engaged in one or the other variation of the hypostatisation of a particular. And, even if it does not lead the interlocutor to give up her position, it may lead to better (analytic or continental) arguments in support of a position. At least, the conversation continues. The Nietzschean and pragmatist stance carries on as the murmur of a constant reminder: where the philosopher *qua* metaphysician (analytic or continental) all too often aims to uncover the real face behind the mask, the pragmatist tries to show that beneath the mask has been yet another. *Jusqu'au bout*.

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There probably still is a Continental - Analytic divide in philosophy, but it is entirely irrelevant and therefore completely unnecessary to "be bridged." Although bookstores in New York and London do not hold two sets of philosophy, nor have separate labels for Continental and Analytic, the first of these two really is an introduction and preamble into the latter. If we ignore some radical and trivial suggestions about the abandonment of the 'historical element in philosophy' or the erasure of Anglo-American philosophy from some imaginary 'European philosophy', so-called continental philosophers are today mostly aging or are to be found outside the walls of universities. They rarely if ever lecture at philosophy departments in Europe and the US, publish in philosophy journals, and their heirs and followers mostly cannot find work in departments and research institutions of philosophy. Not only can a young philosopher specializing exclusively in Deleuze or Heidegger not find work today, but she is aware that her task is to uncover and resolve problems of the community and that philosophy is a public and communicative endeavor. The analysis and comparison of texts, study of context and knowledge of historical models does not represent an advantage. The young philosopher, regardless of whether English is his first or second language, reads and studies philosophy in this language. It is closer to him than other philosophies.

My talk, remember, is entirely about Galen Strawson's 1978 stay in Paris, just before beginning his doctoral studies at Oxford with Derek Parfit ("I attended the *Ecole Normale Supérieure* as an *auditeur libre* and French government scholar, joining Jacques Derrida's *Groupe de Recherche pour l'Enseignement de la Philosophie* and his seminar for Yale students in Paris - trying (without success) to understand what he was talking about"). More than twenty years later, when I arrived, I certainly did not encounter the same Derrida - this late Derrida was very clear and concise - nor was I interested in whether what he did was in philosophy or on its margins. I wished to learn to use his "method without method," although really part of any methodology. And I held Derrida *a priori* responsible for never constructing a dialogue with (for example) Putnam, for not bridging the Analytic-Continental divide. Regardless of the fact that Derrida spent 1957 at Harvard, as a so-called *special auditor*, recipient

of a year-long "Augustus Clifford Tower Fellowship,"¹ it seems to me that it was his love for literature that determined his great resistance and distance to philosophy as such (and not even only the analytic kind). This resistance weakened over time, and it would appear that we have lost it entirely.

1 Jacques Derrida, along with Roger Martin, translates the English manuscript of the Quine's "Les frontières de la théorie logique," *Les études philosophiques*, n. 2, April-June 1964, 191-208. This text is preceded by a text by Nagel (who had just obtained his doctorate at Harvard), also translated from the English manuscript, by Derrida's wife, Marguerite Derrida.