


Πρόγραμμα Ημερίδας
Conference schedule

Consciousness & Self-hood

Dionysis Christias
Anthony Hatzimoysis
Costas Pagondiotis
Costas Picolas
Nikos Soueltzis
Miltos Theodosiou



Dan Zahavi

13.30 - 21.00

ΑΣΚΤ • Αίθουσα de Chirico
ASFA • De Chirico auditorium

διοργάνωση • GAVAGAI | υποστήριξη • ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΕΥΡΑΣΙΑ

Abstracts

Taking Oneself As an Object

Miltos Theodosiou PhD Candidate, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales

The basic idea of my presentation consists in the claim that the notion of the self as an object presupposes that pre-reflective consciousness be understood as involving the power of reflection, the latter actualized in a non-discursive, non-propositional mode or form. The argument I shall put forward has the characteristics of a transcendental argument: for the taking of oneself as an object to be possible, and therefore for judgments about one's self as an object to be possible, the power of judgment should already be operative in pre-judgmental consciousness, providing it with the proper shape for exercises of judgment to come. This has repercussions for how Dan Zahavi's notion of 'minimal self' should be understood.

Two modes of Givenness of Pre-reflective Self-consciousness

Dionysis Christias Post-Doc Fellow, University of Patras

In this paper I attempt to criticize a certain strand of thinking about self-consciousness that is prevalent in contemporary phenomenological circles. Specifically, I will argue that Zahavi's account of the 'experiential self' (2014) is so thin that its connection with the pre-reflective dimension of selfhood at the distinctively human, conceptual, 'space of reasons' level becomes incomprehensible.

Is phenomenal self-consciousness necessary for consciousness?

Costas Pagondiotis Assistant Professor, University of Patras

Our relation to our own conscious mental acts seems to be different from our relation to those of other subjects. The distinctive character of this first-personal relation consists mainly in its transparency, authority and directness. What kind of self-conscious relation to our conscious acts can account for

these features? I will limit myself to the examination of two dominant approaches that both conceive of the self-conscious relation as intrinsic to the first-order mental act. The reason for this restriction is that attempts to conceive of the self-conscious relation as an extrinsic relation between the conscious state and a distinct second-order state face insuperable problems. The first approach conceives of self-consciousness as integral to the phenomenal character of consciousness and the self-conscious relation as an actual relation to the conscious act. This is a non-intentional and non-conceptual relation, a kind of acquaintance relation. I will examine whether this approach accounts for the distinctive character of the first-personal relation and I will argue against the adequacy of the approach. The second approach conceives of the self-conscious relation as a potential relation to the conscious act which is further specified as intentional, conceptual, non-receptive and agentive. I will argue that this approach gives a better account of the first personal relation and I will suggest a way to extend its application to passive conscious states.

Self-awareness and bodily temporality in Husserl

Nikos Soueltzis Post-Doc Fellow, University of Patras

In my presentation I will discuss the issue of self-awareness at the level of lived-bodily temporality from a Husserlian perspective. After a brief reference to Husserl's theory of time and bodily-consciousness as well as of their respective and distinct forms of pre-reflective self-awareness, I will deal with our sense of touch as manifesting in a paradigmatic fashion our lived-bodily temporal self-awareness. Owing to the peculiar affectivity of its specific sensuous character we discern its distinctive temporal structure. The latter constitutes the "implicit temporality" of our lived-bodily existence, i.e., the continuity of our implicit feeling of being alive that permeates our habitual practical performances. The felt yet tacit presence of our palpating fingers qua palpating is experienced through the implicit self-presence of the lived-body in the touching tips as much as the absorbed anticipation of the grasping hand rushes through the pending self-affectation of the touching lived-body. It is in the (self-) affective dimension of touching that our primal temporal self-awareness peculiar to our sensing is most prominently intertwined with the temporal self-awareness characterizing our practical comportment.

Is the 'Minimally Conscious State patient' minimally self-aware?

Costas Picolas PhD Candidate University of Patras

Minimally Conscious State (MCS) patients constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to Vegetative State patients who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or covert signs of awareness in such patients the question of self-awareness has only scarcely been addressed. Even in the occasion where self-awareness is evaluated it is only higher order or reflective self-awareness that is the target of such investigations. In the first part of this paper I briefly review the relevant clinical neuroscience literature to demonstrate that the conception of self-awareness at play in such studies is indeed that of reflective self-awareness. In the second part I present the philosophical notion of pre-reflective (or minimal) self-awareness. This is shown to primarily refer to the implicit awareness of our embodied subjectivity which essentially permeates all our experiences. As discussed this minimal self-awareness is not specifically addressed when clinically or experimentally assessing MCS patients. My suggestion is that neuroimaging studies targeting minimal self-awareness as in First-Person Perspective taking paradigms could be used with MCS patients to shed light on the question whether those individuals are minimally self-aware even in the case where they lack self-reflective abilities. I conclude that empirical evidence of this kind would have important theoretical implications for the discussion about the notion of self-awareness but also have important medical and social/legal implications for MCS patients' management.

Anxiety and the Self

Anthony Hatzimoysis Associate Professor, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens

According to an influential line of reasoning, within the phenomenological tradition, there is a set of fundamental moods attendance to which reveals important truths about our existence. And perhaps none of the moods is as revealing about the human predicament as the mood of anxiety. In the first part of my presentation I shall assess the prospects of contemporary attempts to make sense of moods as intentional

states. In the second part, I shall focus on anxiety in contradistinction to fear, and will conclude with some remarks about how affectivity pertains to the self.

Consciousness, self-consciousness, selfhood

Dan Zahavi Professor, University of Copenhagen & University of Oxford

In my talk, I will first briefly outline the main ideas and motivations behind the introduction of a minimalist notion of self. I will then consider a number of challenges and criticisms that this notion has recently been subjected to. These criticisms all engage in various ways with what might be called the universality question. If it is the case that our experiences are accompanied by a minimal sense of self such that one might talk of the existence of an experiential self, is it then something that holds with necessity, such that it characterizes all experiences however minimal or disordered they might be? Is it something that only holds for normal, adult, experiences? Or might it be something that only holds under rather special circumstances, say, when we reflectively scrutinize and appropriate our experiences?

13.30 - 14.00 Greetings

14.00 - 16.00 1st Session

Chair Georgios Filippopoulos, PhD Complutense University of Madrid

Miltos Theodosiou PhD Candidate, EHESS

Taking Oneself As an Object

Dionysis Christias Post-Doc Fellow, University of Patras

Two modes of Givenness of Pre-reflective Self-consciousness

Costas Pagondiotis Assistant Professor, University of Patras

Is phenomenal self-consciousness necessary for consciousness?

16.00 - 16.30 Break

16.30 - 18.30 2nd Session

Chair Evi Grammati, PhD Candidate, University of Patras

Nikos Soueltzis Post-Doc Fellow, University of Patras

Self-awareness and bodily temporality in Husserl

Costas Picolas PhD Candidate University of Patras

Is the 'Minimally Conscious State patient' minimally self-aware?

Anthony Hatzimoysis Associate Professor, University of Athens

Anxiety and the Self

18.30 - 19.00 Break

19.00 - 20.30 Keynote

Dan Zahavi Professor, University of Copenhagen & University of Oxford

Consciousness, self-consciousness, selfhood